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ABSTRACT
Singapore faces a massive over-supply of a comprehensive
range of property developments today. This over-supply is
expected to continue increasing till 1988. As a result,
the local property market has gravitated to a trough. The
slide of the property market began in 1982 after the market
peaked briefly at an unprecedented high point. The
depressed property market is adversely affecting
Singapore's economic growth. The examination of recent
government land sales to the private sector reveals
possible causative agents. The land sales were conducted
as a central part of Singapore's urban redevelopment
programme. The backdrop to the investigation is provided
by an understanding of the government's plans for
Singapore's economic development. Pronounced cyclicality
of the property market is analysed to be an artifact of
strictly public sector planning for urban redevelopment. A
private sector-public sector collaborative planning effort
for urban development is proposed to ensure a better
balance of supply and demand.
Thesis Advisor: Lloyd Rodwin
Ford Professor, Director of SPURS ProgramTitle :
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INTRODUCTION
The island republic of Singapore emerged at the beginning
of this decade as one of the progressive newly
industrialising countries. While much of the world was
still caught in a recession towards the end of the 1970's,
Singapore embarked on a rapid modernisation programme. The
new dawn of Singapore's economic development arrived at the
end of 1978 when the republic awakened from a 4-year period
of economic slowdown that was accompanied by a weak, local
property market. The ambitions of this city state required
a drastic urban face-lift and infrastructural improvements
in an effort to become a world-class financial, commercial
services and convention centre.
As Singapore's property market strengthened towards the end
of 1978, signs were ominous for a construction boom within
the next 2 years. Singapore's government saw this to be
the appropriate moment to accelerate the on-going urban
renewal programme that would lead to the republic's
modernisation. Through its agency, the Urban Redevelopment
Authority, the government sold large amounts of urban land
in 1978-82 to the private sector for a comprehensive range
of developments. Hotels with convention and exhibition
facilities, office and commercial buildings, warehouses and
factories, and condominium projects would be developed on
8
the purchased land parcels. By 1988, all these
developments would come on-stream. In 1982, however,
Singapore's property market then began to slump, in the
wake of a massive real estate over-supply. The market
price of properties depreciated by 25%-35% over the
following 2 years. Today, the property market continues
to soften, and a number of these projects are being delayed
or shelved. The faltering property market has led to a
slow-down in Singapore's economic growth.
That there are problems with Singapore's economy now is a
fact which the government does not deny; however, the
government side-steps the issue of the cause and effect of
the current economic slow-down. On 29 March 1985, in a
Parliamentary session, the Minister for Trade and Industry,
Dr. Richard Hu, said that the recovery of the property
market is necessary for the local economy to continue its
growth. He terms the property sector as "the fundamental
sector" and said that this sector has to recover before the
other sectors of the economy since Singapore has limited
amounts of land. According to him, Singapore's property
market was simply going through its natural 7-9 year cycle,
and that it had gravitated into a trough corresponding to
that of 1978.
It is my hypothesis that inadequacies in government
1 extrapolation from Economic Development Board's Property
Index in 1983 Economic Survey of Singapore.
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planning led to the current property cycle peaking rapidly
in 1981, to be suddenly followed by a trough that has yet
to bottom-out in 1985. The government was not aware of how
its system of land sales was creating speculative gains
that would eventually be lost. The escalation of property
prices to a peak in 1981 was an unintended consequence of
the manner in which the Urban Redevelopment Authority
conducted the sale of government land. Developers
contributed to this escalation by making irrationally high
bids for the government land. In the 1983 Economic Surve,
the Ministry of Trade and Industry's Statistics
Department suggested that the slide of the property marIet
was caused by the crash of the local stock market.
However, I shall show that the same actors, interacting in
the land sale, precipitated the property market collapse as
-surely as they contributed to the market's unsustainable
peak. As the property sector is an important part of
Singapore's economy, the economic ripples caused by the
current centralised urban planning imply a reconsideration
of how planning should be done. I propose a collaborative
planning effort, by both the private and public sectors for
urban development, whereby the property sector will be less
prone to cycles. Collaborative planning involves the
coming together of both sectors to decide the scale. and
timing for urban redevelopment. More will be said about
this in Chapter 5.
The first 2 chapters of my thesis set the background and
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relate how public sector urban planning has adversely
affected Singapore's economy. Chapter 1 relates how the
urban renewal programme has been the lever for Singapore's
modernisation in the light of the republic's economic
development since 1959. The sale of government land is
portrayed as a major component of Singapore's urban renewal
scheme. I then discuss the relationship of the two major
actors of this programme, the private sector and the Urban
Redevelopment Authority. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of
the Urban Redevelopment Authority's tender system for
selling land by examining the conditions of the tender. A
decision model of the tender system enables us to study the
impacts of the tender system on the property market. I
also test the decision model with empirical observations.
It is in this framework that we can see the inadequacies of
public sector planning for urban renewal. Furthermore, we
see how the interaction of developers with the government
agency in the land sales fostered the "unreal estate boom".
Chapter 3 describes a model of Singapore's economic
development that reflects the policy-makers' pragmatism. I
describe how regional circumstances act as the stimuli for
the formulation of ad hoc policies. I also offer a view on
how the decision to construct a mass rapid transit system
affected the pace and pattern of the urban renewal
programme. We can then see that the government showed
undue optimistism and opportunism in its urban
redevelopment policies. Chapter 4 merges the inferences
11
drawn from the analysis of the URA land sale strategies and
the government's style of policy-making. From this, I
construct the mechanism that provoked a sudden peaking and
just as sudden collapse of the property market. I describe
how the property market collapse has led to a depressed
economy. The chapter also includes an account of recent
government measures to prop up the market. I argue that
such measures do not address the system defects inherent in
the management of Singapore's urban redevelopment. A
possible solution is a collaborative planning effort for
urban redevelopment. Chapter 5 discusses the merits of
collaborative planning for urban redevelopment. Such a
planning mechanism features facilitated informational
processes and an avenue for social learning. Collaborative
planning involves decentralisation and points are made as
to why the republic's government should welcome this. All
the arguments mesh into an overview of how costs can be
better controlled and uncertainty better dealt with. By
way of concluding.my thesis, I draw attention to some areas
for further research.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
This chapter gives a brief historical account of Singapore
and its development over the last 26 years. It highlights
the way the government went about the task of ensuring the
economic viability of the country. A model for urban
development evolved as the country progressed. The
government currently envisions Singapore as a space-age
garden city with facilities that will establish it as the
key financial centre in Asia. This is the unifying concept
of the present urban redevelopment programme. The
government embarked on a plan in the late 70's to rapidly
achieve its objectives. Private sector participation is
necessary in Singapore's modernisation, and so the Urban
Redevelopment Authority was formed to orchestrate the
combined efforts of both public and private sectors. The
government, with a virtual monopoly on urban land, releases
designated parcels for development in a series of land
sales. Private developers willingly carry the risks and the
financial burden of the urban renewal programme in the
hpursuit of profit. Effectively, they are just
implementers of government policies in this top-down
scheme.
1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINGAPORE (1959-1985)
Singapore is an island republic in S-E Asia, about 225
square miles in size. It gained its independence from
Great Britain in 1959, and in 1963 formed an uneasy
alliance with Malaysia, then known as Malaya. The alliance
was short-lived, and Singapore left the Federation of
Malaya in 1965. Few believed the island republic could
become economically viable on its own as it has no natural
13
'resources of any kind. The only natural asset that the
republic possessed was its harbour, and under a pragmatic
leadership, one of the prongs of economic development
centred on the exploitation of this asset.
In order to harness the island's harbour potential, the
government quickly realised that the port facilities had to
be expanded along with the redevelopment of the city that
had grown around the waterfront. To this end, the urban
redevelopment scheme was launched. The renewed city would
be able to accomodate the communication link-ups, and house
the trading and financial institutions which are structural
elements of an entrepot port. Thus, the ends of
Singapore's physical development is economic viability.
The means rested on the ability to make the most efficient
use of its limited land area.
Singapore's port has since become the second largest port
in the world, in terms of tonnage handled, having leap-
frogged over Hong Kong, Yokohama and New York City in the
last two and a half decades. It has emerged as one of the
most well-run economies of the Third World, and today its
population of 2.5 million people can look back to more than
20 years of sustained growth. The republic's leadership
can take full credit for weaving this success story and
making Singapore the most politically stable country in a
region filled with unrest and racial conflicts. As the
republic grew more and more prosperous, the government's
aspirations for it also grew. Thus, schemes to achieve
14
economic viability were modified to propel Singapore to the
forefront of world commerce.
1.2 THE SPACE-AGE GARDEN CITY
The government's vision for Singapore's urban centre has
evolved into that of a clean and green city boasting a sky-
line that would be the envy of any other city. The
government believes that the form of the city is critical
in realising Singapore's function as a major financial and
services centre. The government envisages such functions
as being necessary to sustain Singapore's growth. In the
late 70's when Singapore was on the verge of a construction
boom, the government saw this as an opportune time to
catalyse the republic's modernisation. The perceived pot
of gold at the rainbow's end of accelerated development
became the establishment of Singapore as Asia's prime
financial centre.
To this end, the government designated a multitude of urban
land sites from its land-bank for comprehensive development
mainly by the private sector. Two major urban satellites,
Raffles City and Marina Centre, would be constructed by
1986 to offer services and facilities to tourists, business
travellers and multinational corporations operating in
Singapore. Raffles City, a project covering 3 hectares,
would contain 2 hotels (one of which would be the world's
tallest hotel at 73 storeys), a 42-storey office tower, and
a 7-storey podium to house the country's largest convention
15
and shopping centre. While the government has retained
much of the financial interests in this urban satellite, it
sub-divided Marina Centre and sold the two parcels to the
private sector for an even larger scale development.
The government believed that Singapore's metamorphosis
would be completed by the construction of a mass rapid
transit system. In this way, traffic congestion would be
relieved and travel time in the republic would be reduced.
The proceeds from the sale of the urban land parcels to
private developers would finance the mass rapid transit
system. Thus, the government conceived the idea of making
one component of Singapore's modernisation pay for the
other. The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), a quasi-
government agency, would manage the land sales and be the
guiding force of the urban redevelopment. The URA's
capacity to perform in this manner is defined by the
statute known as the Urban Redevelopment Authority Act
enacted by Parliament in 1974.
1.3 THE URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
As the transformation of Singapore unfolded, the need for
an urban environment consistent with the aspirations of a
modern city state became increasingly evident. In 1966,
the government established the Urban Renewal Department
within the public sector housing agency, Housing
Development Board (HDB), for the sole purpose of creating
such an environment. The physical, social and economic
16
regeneration which was entrusted to the Urban Renewal
Department focuses principally on the Central Area.
Historically, the Central Area was the origin of urban
growth in Singapore; for this reason, banking and
commercial activity was concentrated there. However, the
persistent, haphazard development and congestion in that
area was too great a task for just a department within the
HDB to undertake. In 1974, the Urban Redevelopment
Authority was formed to take up this challenge and accorded
the same status as the HDB - an independent statutory body
under the auspices of the Ministry of National Development.
1.4 THE SALE OF SITES PROGRAMME
The URA promotes urban renewal primarily by selling
government land, mostly in or close to the Central Area, to
private developers via a tender system (discussed in
Chapter 3). In eleven land sales, the URA has established
itself as the most significant source of development sites.
The first land sale was launched in 1967 and the 11th
conducted in 1982.
1.4.1 THE GOVERNMENT'S LAND BANK1
The URA acts as the agent for the government which is the
biggest land-owner in the republic through its colonial
legacy. When the British gave Singapore its independence,
1 the main source for this section is Motha (1981)
except for the effect of zoning.
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the crown's ownership of land was transferred to the new
republic's government. The government is able to add to
its land-bank through legislation providing for compulsory
acquisition based on the principle of eminent domain.
Furthermore, legislation also endows the government with
exclusive rights to land reclamation. By filling soil
around the Central Area waterfront, the government has
created vacant land for the extension of the Central Area
sea-wards. The government owns about 70% of the land in
Singapore and its monopoly of land will increase further.
This is because many of the land leases held by the private
sector will expire in the next decade, and the land will
revert to the government.
Compulsory acquisition of land is the most effective device
available to the government for keeping urban renewal in
motion. The compensation that the government makes to the
land-owners is based on "current use" values assessed in
November 1973. The government is able to assemble
fragmented and/or under-utilised sites, usually in private
ownership, into larger land parcels more feasible for
comprehensive development. The land parcels are then
offered for sale to private developers by the URA. The
government is able to increase the value of its land
parcels by exercising its powers of zoning. In most cases,
the land parcels are not zoned to be of higher land-use
than adjacent sites. Rather, other sites of potentially
competing usage in another part of the city may be re-zoned
18
to embody lower commercial use. The result is enhancement
of government land value at the expense of private land.
1.4.2 TOP-DOWN MANAGEMENT IN URBAN RENEWAL
The Sale of Sites Programme ensures that land parcels
revert to private ownership. The government plans the
redevelopment and provides the basic infastructure together
with other urban services to facilitate private
development. The private sector supplies the finances, a
vital element of the programme, and the expertise for
implementing the redevelopment plans. The URA sees this
scheme of urban redevelopment to be one of co-operation
between the public and private sector.
The URA specifies the conditions for development in line
with the agency's planning objectives. The timing of the
land sales is supposedly influenced by feedback from the
private sector and market analysis for the various types of
development planned. In reality, however, policy
directives from the Minister for National Development over-
ride all other factors. The urban redevelopment programme,
thus, really involves top-down management in the sense that
the directives come overwhelmingly from the centre of power
in the government. The implementers of the programme, the
private sector, are unable to shift the course or the
design of the programme and are not privy to all the
related information. Vital information such as what other
land parcels would be released as well as when in the
19
future is not disclosed. Yet, they bear the burden of the
urban redevelopment of Singapore by financially and
physically ensuring its realisation. Even though there is
co-operation by private developers with the government in
Singapore's urban redevelopment, there is no collaboration
in planning for this programme.
1.4.3 WHY DEVELOPERS PARTICIPATE
Without the government acting as an intermediary as
current legislation allows, private developers would have
poor access to potentially profit-embodying land. Private
developers are keen to participate in the Sales of Sites
Programme to gain this access. In addition, the URA's
land parcels are free of all encumbrances and receive
highest priority for approval by the Ministry of National
Development; this applies also in the event that the
developer wishes to make minor amendments to the building
plans at a later stage.
In this case, the developer has to obtain permission from
the URA first and then submit the amended building plan to
the Ministry of National Development's Development Control
Division for final approval. During a property boom, time
saved in the Development Control Division's review of the
revised building plans can mean a substantial difference in
profits.
Last but not least, URA land parcels are exempt from
development charges. The Singapore government extracts a
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tax from developers, termed as the development charge, for
the enhanced value of land which the government re-zones or
has given approval for more intensive use. The government
imposes such a tax in line with its stated philosophy that
developers should not have windfall gains without returning
part of it to society. The development charge is
predicated on 70% of the enhanced value of the land, as
assessed by the government.
Thus, the land parcels offered by the URA have much appeal
to the private sector. This is evident in the great
interest in the Sale of Sites Programme especially in the
heydays of 1978 to 1981. Developers from many parts of
East Asia competed with local developers in these years
with the result that the urban land market soared.
However, the fact that information does not readily flow
from the top to the bottom in the redevelopment programme
leads to irrational expectations on the part of developers.
Furthermore, the tender system which the URA employs to
sell land prohibits the information exchange among
developers vying for land parcels in the Sale of Sites
Programme. The possibility then exists for naive
developers who have less than an adequate sense of the
market but are willing to enter into the urban land market
at greater expense to themselves than necessary. These two
1 Planning (Development Charges) Amendment Rules, 1976
(S. 222/76)
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factors in tandem allowed the government to gross S$2.86
billion in the 5 sales of 1978-1982. The inherent
instability accompanying this top-down scheme and the
restriction of information flow among developers finally
became apparent in 1983.
The next chapter presents an analysis of the tender system
in an effort to show how developers from the private sector
are induced into biting off more than they can chew in
URA's land sales. We shall see how this allocation of land
parcels used by the URA drives land prices up and is
effectively a destabilising element of Singapore's urban
redevelopment.
1 URA released this figure to local press in 1985. See
also Appendix D.
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CHAPTER 2
PLANNING GONE WRONG
In the Sale of Sites Programme, the URA makes use of a
tender system to allocate land parcels to developers. The
URA attaches conditions to the tender to prevent land
speculation and to expedite construction. The tender can
be analysed as a decision model that incorporates pre-
qualification, a constrained market mechanism, adjudication
and bargaining. The tender results in added costs for
development. Speculation instead of being excluded is
nurtured in the property market. The URA is itself guilty
of making speculative gains by extracting increases in land
price through the tender. The URA's 1978-82 land sales
shaped the exaggerated peak and trough of Singapore's
current property cycle. Irrational expectations on the
part of URA, developers and final consumers fuelled this
rapid rise then collapse in property prices. The market is
not likely to recover because of a massive over-supply of
which URA projects are a major proportion. The end result
is that URA's urban renewal plans have gone astray.
2.1 URA'S TENDER SYSTEM
The tender is an allocation device used in engineering
projects to award construction contracts to contractors
submitting the best bids. The ideal bid would be the
proposal having the technically superior project design
with the lowest construction cost. This hardly ever
happens since the attributes of project design and costs
usually have an inverse relationship. Thus, a trade-off
must be made. The proposal selected, then, is the one
having an adjudged optimal mix of construction cost and
23
project design. The URA makes use of this system to
allocate land designated for development to private
developers based on the principle of the optimal
combination of development design and price bid for the
land. From the URA's perspective, however, the highest bid
for the land parcel coupled with the adjudged superior
design would be the ideal bid.
The tender system is put into operation when the URA
launches a sale, consisting of several land parcels, as
part of the urban renewal programme. For each land parcel,
the URA stipulates the specifications and constraints for
development, and the conditions for tender for the
sites. The specifications include the type of use for the
building, plot ratio (floor area ratio), building density
and height restrictions if any. The URA issues developer's
packets which contain all this information, as well as site
plans and the necessary documents for preparing a tender.
Interested developers then commission architects to design
a proposed development within the URA constraints.
The URA specifies a time period, usually 3 months, for
developers to prepare their tenders. For each land parcel
that a developer is interested in, he must deliver the
price bid in a sealed envelope to URA's headquarters by the
given date. The proposed designs in the form of plans
and models must accompany the price bids. URA officials
then select what they believe to be the best tender for
24
each parcel, after which a public announcement of the
results is made. The URA's decision on the awarding of
tenders is final, and there is no recourse for appeal by
unsuccessful tenderers.
2.2 CONDITIONS FOR TENDERING
The URA attaches a whole list of conditions to the tender
and purchase of the land parcels. The stated objective of
the agency in doing so is to prevent land speculation and
to ensure that development takes place within a specified
time frame. The developers participating in the tender are
subject to the following conditions:-
1) That a detailed design with a model of the proposed
scheme, except for industrial projects, must be submitted
by the tenderer.
2) That the tender, comprising the design and the actual
bid for the land parcel, must be prepared and submitted
by the tenderer in the strictest of confidence. No
communication is permitted among individual tenderers
and upon discovery of collusion, the guilty parties will
be disqualified from the tender. The fear of government
reprisals in Singapore is shared by all commercial
entities, and so collusion is virtually non-existent.
3) The selection of the winning tender will be solely from
the tenders received i.e. no correspondence from the
tenderers will be entertained from the time that the
tenders are submitted to the announcement of the
25
results.
4) That the tenderer agrees to a schedule of payments for
the land parcel, set by the agency, and is bound to
undertake the development of the parcel. The maximum
period for payment is 10 years. In such a case, the
interest at 1% above the average local prime
rate is payable to the agency. Once the parcel has been
awarded, no sub-sale or re-sale of the land parcel is
allowed, except with URA's permission.
5) A specific construction time of the proposed development
is set by the agency. Unless the agency revises this
schedule, any delays will be subject to penalties
payable to the agency. Penalties are calculated as 2% of
the land cost per month of delay and pro-rated
accordingly.
6) In the event of substantial delays, URA has the right to
buy back on advantageous terms.
7) The purchaser must retain 30% of the scheme in one
ownership for 10 years after completion. The company
incorporated to develop the land must also have
substantial paid-up capital in relation to the
development costs.
8) The construction force for the proposed development must
comprise at least 50% of imported labour. This
condition is in line with the government's aim that
Singapore's small native labour pool is to be employed
for more highly skilled work.
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2.3 URA'S TENDER SYSTEM AS A DECISION MODEL
The URA's tender system for allocating land parcels to the
private sector can be analysed in the form of a decision
model, with 4 components: pre-qualification, constrained
market, adjudication and bargaining.
2.3.1 PRE-QUALIFICATION
The first component of the decision-making process of the
URA is the pre-qualification stage. In requiring the
submission of scale models and architectural plans and
perspectives, and the agreement to the schedule of
payments, the URA effectively defines the pool of
tenderers. These conditions ensure that only developers
with substantial financial resources and accessibility to
technical expertise - therefore, those most likely to see
the project through to completion - are able to participate
in the tender.
2.3.2 CONSTRAINED MARKET
The fundamental condition of confidentiality to be observed
by the tenderers and the agency embody the secrecy in this
system - this secret bidding is what separates the tender
from the auction as an allocational process. The auction
is a pure market mechanism where bids are made in the open
allowing for counter-bids. On the other hand, the tender
is a quasi-market mechanism as it allows a one-time bid
only. The fact that communication among tenderers is
prohibited means that developers are unable to assess each
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other's feelings of the market. In this way, only a very
rough idea of a given land parcel's price is held by the
tenderers. Their willingness to pay would be bench-marked
from their individual expectations of the market as well as
the prevailing market price for a comparable site. An
optimistic developer might submit a bid which is above the
site's market price, expecting its price to appreciate. An
overly optimistic developer might well bid far above market
price. Furthermore, being unaware of what the rest are
bidding, the overly optimistic developer might also bid far
above the rest of the tenderers.
The URA constrains the market mechanism further by setting
a floor price for each land parcel, which is probably URA's
assessed value for the site. The URA withdrew certain land
parcels from the 10th land sale in 1981 on the basis that
the bids for the parcels were "unrealistic". By this, the
URA meant that the bids were below the floor price that it
had set for the land parcels. Presumably, the floor price
is URA's precautionary measure against all the tenderers
colluding to under-bid. However, the floor price also
weeds out a pool of tenderers who may have a less
optimistic, but more realistic, expectation of the market
than URA.
2.3.3 ADJUDICATION
The URA judges the merits of the proposed development's
design as a criterion for awarding the land parcel.
Importance is accorded to aesthetics and the blending of
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adjacent proposed developments into a harmonious urban
environment. In having the design criterion in the tender,
the URA does not share Hough and Kratz's belief (1983) that
the marketplace will respond favourably to "good" new
architecture. The URA's idea of "good" architecture is, in
all likelihood, influenced by the government's zest for a
futuristic city; adjudication allows URA to fulfill the
government's desire. Thus, projects embodying state-of-
the-art architecture are likely to be favoured. Architects
of world-renown such as Kenzo Tange, I.M. Pei, Paul Rudolph
and John Portman were commissioned by tenderers to produce
several outstanding designs. The URA shows preference for
buildings of eye-catching architecture with high-quality
finish rather than buildings that embody cost-saving
innovations.
2.3.4 BARGAINING
Within the spirit of traditional tenders, bargaining by the
decision-maker and the tenderer is excluded. However, the
URA or its chosen nominee has on occasion engaged in
bargaining. This might happen in the event that a
developer has submitted an adjudged superior design
accompanied by a much lower bid than the highest bid
submitted for the same land parcel. The developer is then
discreetly asked to revise his bid upwards, if he is
willing, so that the URA can have its cake and eat it
too. Thus, URA contravenes its own rules by giving the
developer another try at bidding and raises doubt about
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the equity of this system.
2.3.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The main observation that crystallises from the decision
model of URA's tender system is that all 4 decision-
making stages could possibly lead to greater development
costs to be borne by the developer. Consider the pre-
qualification of tenderers: developers are made aware that
they are in a high-stakes game where everyone is well-
equipped financially and able to commission the most
famous architects. A one-upsmanship mentality is, thus,
evoked - the tendency will be to bid a little higher and
submit a more eye-catching proposal. For the developer
that submits the winning tender, his costs of development
are certainly factored upwards because of this.
However, unsuccessful tenders also incur costs for the
other developers and architects because of the lengthy time
involved in preparing tenders. The requirement of scale
models translates to high costs as models of elaborate
schemes cost up to S$45,000 in 1980. The local architects
are known to subsidise the costs of preparing tenders just
so that developers would engage their services rather than
that of foreign architects. The developer who tendered
unsuccessfully would usually pay a local architect an
"abortive" fee of S$5,000-10,000. However, the
1 this and the following cost figures in this section are
obtained from the local developer, Far East Organisation
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architectural work done on each design can cost up to 3
times as much. Over a period of tenders, local architects
would charge the rest of society more for their services to
recoup costs incurred in subsidising tender preparations.
"Abortive" fees of foreign architects are known to be in
the region of S$100,000 but in this case, the developer
incurs all the cost.
The URA's choice among the tenders is also based on the
constrained market mechanism. In submitting a bid, a
developer has to assess what a given land parcel is worth
to him and what it is worth to other tenderers. Most
developers calculate the land parcel's worth using the
"affordable cost" method. They start off by forecasting
the selling price of the completed project and then take
away the costs of development including interest payments,
overheads, and architects' fee. The balance is the land
cost and the profit. The developer has a feel of what the
land is worth to him once he decides his profit margin.
The key to the exercise is predicting the expected selling
price 4-5 years ahead. This is where the problems lie.
Developers who expect the market to continue on an upward
trend would estimate a higher selling price than the
current price.
At the same time, each developer is trying to guess what
a given land parcel is worth to the others. The mentality
of one-upsmanship pervades this guessing game, especially
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if developers think that the upward trend is a permanent
feature, and that URA projects are highly profitable.
Large developers espousing this view would add a premium to
their bids for prestigious projects to increase their
chances of securing the tender. On the other hand, other
developers wanting to jump on the money-making band-wagon
would strategically bid for smaller and less coveted sites.
In this case, these developers would also add premiums to
their bids. Thus, high bids would be submitted for most if
not all the land parcels offered for sale. In the event,
however, that developers begin to have a pessimistic view
of the market and bid lower consequently, the URA's floor
price device ensures that purchase prices do not move down.
The parcels are simply withdrawn and lower purchase prices
do not become evident. Effectively, the purchase price can
move only upwards in each successive sale.
The international firm of real estate valuers, Richard
Ellis made the satirical comment that it was a happy
coincidence for the URA that its 3 sales of 1979-81 should
set new records in land prices each time. Richard Ellis
also compiled a data-base of the purchase prices of the URA
land sales based on market information (see Appendix E). A
survey of the land prices paid by the winning tenderers
gives empirical support to the idea that developers
participating in URA tenders are induced to over-bid. The
1 Richard Ellis: 1983 Singapore Property Market Review
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best example of this is from the 9th sale in 1980 where a
developer paid S$4500 psf for a land parcel on Cecil
Street, in the Central Area, that had been independently
assessed at $3000 psf, prior to the sale. In the same
sale, there were also 2 roughly comparable parcels on this
street and all were given planning approval for the same
plot ratio. The purchase prices (psf) for the other
parcels were S$3200 and S$3700. Even differences in
frontage do not account for such a disparity; this
dispersion of prices is simply a manifestation of the
constrained market mechanism.
The design criterion of URA possibly introduces the most
significant costs into the development process. This is
especially true for the prestigious projects, many of which
were proposed in the URA land sales. Firstly, foreign
architects are invariably commissioned for the design work
because they are perceived to be more accomplished
technically than local architects. Naturally, their fees
are significantly higher than local architects and they
build in costs for travel and other expenses. Secondly,
the elaborate design of a project means more costly
construction specifications. Thus, higher quality
materials and finishes would be used as well as higher
skilled workers, all entailing greater costs. The
services of foreign consultant engineers and contractors
would then be required, bringing up the costs yet again.
These elements of the construction of the proposed project
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makes the project extremely vulnerable to cost escalation.
For example, Marina Square which is one of the two
developments at Marina Centre, situated on the land parcel
sold in 1978, was originally estimated to cost a total of
S$800 million in 1980. Its developers have since suffered
from added costs of another S$250 million. The
magnificently designed Rahardja Centre, also at Marina
Centre, had its construction cost adjusted upwards by S$300
million even before the foundation work was completed.
There is some evidence (Hough and Kratz, 1983) that the
greater building costs of "good" new architecture can be
recovered from premiums in rents but the process of cost
recovery can be painfully slow for the developer.
Bargaining is a two-pronged weapon for added costs because
it contains the cost factoring of both the constrained
market and adjudication. If the URA is able to persuade
the developer, who has submitted the superior design, to
meet the highest price already bid for the land parcel in
question, the developer will then be awarded the land
parcel. His carrying costs are much higher than what would
have been that of others vying for this land parcel. This
is because his purchase price will be the highest, or close
to the highest, in addition to his financial burden of
construction being the greatest. The trade-off between
design and price bid is circumvented by the URA in this
event, but the development costs are amplified.
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2.4 EFFECTS ON THE PROPERTY MARKET
The major effect that the URA tender system had on
Singapore's property market is that after each of the sales
in 1979-81, land prices soared. The media gave much
publicity to the fact that many of the land parcels in the
prestigious parts of the urban area commanded record-
breaking bids. As a result, prices of land-sites adjacent
to these parcels were adjusted accordingly. The property
market as a whole was given a boost; in hindsight, this was
an artificial boost. Together with the momentum that the
market was picking up from pent-up demand since 1978, the
upward trend looked extremely strong.
Consumers rationalised that the increasing sophistication
of developments from the URA land sales which would come
on-line later would mean more costs for them. Existing
real estate developments were also re-valued upwards for 2
reasons. One is that land prices which are a major portion
of development costs in Singapore were climbing. The other
is that both speculators' and investors' willingness to pay
had also gone up. For example, prime office rents and
sales prices rose more than 200% in real terms between 1979
and the end of 1981.1 Speculators had grasped that real
estate promised quick returns. Investors were concerned
with the upward trend that might put properties beyond
their reach.
1 The Economist Magazine, 4 Feb 84
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In a tight market, where the quantity demanded is greater
than that supplied for a given price, the demand schedule
will shift upwards so that the market equilibrates at a
higher price. The shift reflects a greater willingness to
pay on the part of consumers. However, Singapore's
property market in 1980-81 was more heated than it was
tight. In such a market, the demand schedule would not
only shift upwards but possibly transform into a more
inelastic schedule, albeit temporarily. If this
transformation occurs, the high costs of development of the
URA land parcels could be transferred to the final
consumers by the winning tenderers. As regulated by the
Housing Developers Act, however, they were unable to sell
or lease any of the developed units, since their projects
were only about to commence. The Act requires the
developer to be issued a developer's license by the
Ministry of National Development only after all building
plans are finalised and approved. Other developers with
completed real estate developments to offer, on the other
hand, were able to capitalise the appreciation in property
prices.
Thus, the URA tender system, a significant cause of the
price increases, has created a positive externality for
developers not involved in URA projects. The unintended
beneficiaries are given a "free ride", and in the market of
1979-82, there were many such free rides. The tender
system, therefore, makes the local property market more
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inefficient by providing another opportunity for free
rides. This is another adverse effect that URA's tender
system has on Singapore's property market.
The strong upward trend of the property market in 1979-81
did not go unnoticed by the URA. It is ironic that URA's
conditions are attached to the tender to prevent
speculation, while the agency engaged in speculation itself.
This is particularly apparent if we differentiate between
the concepts of land price (or worth) and land value. The
URA enhanced the value of the land parcels through site
assembly and, subsequently, planning for higher density
developments. The agency added value to most of the land
parcels offered for sale in 1978-82, much before the market
began to heat up. The URA only started its land sales when
the market strenthened in 1978 and continued selling only
in a strong market.
Through this strategy, URA's tender system extracted
increases in price that were not commensurate with
increases in value. Indeed, the agency did not create new
value apart from what had already been embodied in the land
parcels. The capitalisation of this illusionary increase
in land value was the speculative gains made by the URA.
Furthermore, in riding along on the upward trend, URA and
the government allowed speculation and land price increases
to feed each other, creating a self-fulfilling cycle. Only
when calls by the public to curb speculation became louder
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in 1982, did the government introduce measures to stop the
free rides.
The most dire effect of the tender system is that it "sowed
the seeds of destruction" within the property market. Land
and in turn, property prices were pushed up too high too
soon. The incompatibility of land prices and land values
became obvious even to the frenzied market. It was then
apparent that the astronomical prices had no relation to
the level of real demand. The market realised that real
demand would not support these prices, which exaggerated
the value. Speculative demand had sustained the prices
primarily, but the speculative demand, being transient, was
dying out. The market was sent on a slide from 1982
onwards with the further realisation that it could not
absorb URA's numerous projects upon completion. Final
demand was simply not growing at the same pace as supply.
The signs of an over-supply were ominous by 1983 and
analysts predicted that the glut would continue to grow
with a vengeance till 1988. However, none ventured to say
that the glut would actually be corrected progressively
after 1988.
2.5 COLLAPSE OF THE PROPERTY MARKET
The quick softening of the property market by 1982 caused
final user transactions to suffer an astounding 61.3%
reduction in nominal value. The 1982 transactions amounted
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to S$616 million against a 1981 high of S$1.59 billion. In
spite of the gloom in the property market, the URA still
released 17 sites that year. The 11th URA Land Sale placed
emphasis on the development of office and terraced
warehouse projects. Altogether, the sales of 1978-82
ensured the private sector's commitment of about S$3
billion dollars towards the purchase of government land.
The significant increase in the republic's commercial space
vacancy rates is an indication of the increasing over-
supply. Table I compares the vacancy rates of Singapore's
stock of office and shop (retail) space in the years 1981
and 1984 to show this increase.
TABLE 1: 1981 vrs. 1984 VACANCIES
National Vacancy Rates
office shop
Mar 1981: 4.4% 10.7%
Mar 1984: 9.8% 13.0%
(source: Building Statistics Quarterly, 1984)
As with the property markets of many of the developed
countries, vacancy rates of 5-7% are what developers in
1 Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 Sept 83
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Singapore can be comfortable with. Thus, the current
vacancy rates which, by all estimates, have increased from
last year's are causing developers more despair. The
picture is even more bleak in the Central Area, the focus
of URA's push for development. The March 1984 vacancy rate
for the private sector's office and shop space in the
1
Central Area was 13% and 12.4% respectively. The private
sector stock of office and shop space is 48% and 20%
2
respectively of the Central Area stock. This is
particularly worrying since the Central Area contains about
3
60% of the whole island's office space ; and the proportion
is growing fast, as URA projects come on-line.
One can assess just how much the URA is contributing to the
growing glut by referring to URA statistics for the land
sales (see Appendix 3), and to projections by the chartered
surveyors, Simon Lim, Oh & Partners.4 Table 2 shows the
contribution of URA projects to Singapore's stock of the
various types of developed space by 1987-88. Simon Lim, Oh
& partners provide the forecast for the overall increase to
the stock and the excess space in the market by 1987-88.
This is assuming that all the URA projects are completed on
schedule.
1 Building Statistics Quarterly, Mar 84
2 ibid
3 ibid
4 Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 Feb 85
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TABLE 2: THE GROWING GLUT
Type of URA's overall projected
development addition increase excess
Hotel (rooms) 8,600 15,700 9,600
Apartments (units) 4,614 19,600 5,400
Office* 3.2 7.3 6.2
Shop* 4.3 5.0 3.7
Warehouse* 3.1 8.0 0.4
Factory* 1.1 17.0 12.7
* in millions of square feet
(sources: Simon Lim, Oh & Partners
Urban Redevelopment Authority)
It seems that the URA correctly anticipated the demand for
warehouse projects. However, where other types of
development are concerned, it lacks foresight in planning.
It is paradoxical that URA's chairman, Mr. C.S. Koh, should
state in the agency's 1983 annual report that the URA has
succeeded in balancing demand and supply of real estate in
Singapore through its land sales. Furthermore, he defended
the launching of the 11th sale in 1982's weak market by
saying that "the making available of more commercial space
should help to further stabilise prices and rentals."
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Instead, the URA has exacerbated especially the glut in the
hotel and retail sectors. In the agency's provision of
shop space through its projects, URA has almost single-
handedly created the shop space over-supply. The agency
would be contributing 86% to the shop space stock increase
while 74% of this stock increase will not be absorbed. URA
hotel projects will account for 55% of the hotel room glut
in 1988 if all these projects are completed on time. The
projections for hotel room demand are based on a best guess
estimate of a 6% annual growth in tourist arrivals.
Towards the end of the 1970's, the Singapore Tourist
Promotion Board (STPB), a quasi-government agency,
predicted a 12% compounded growth rate in tourist arrivals
for the 1980's. However, after the last of the URA land
sales in 1982, the STPB revised its prediction to a 10%
growth rate. In the following year, against everyone's
expectations, tourist arrivals dropped by 4%. Last year,
however, the drop in arrivals was offset by a 4% increase.
Hoare and Govett (Far East) and Simon Lim, Oh & Partners
are currently of the opinion that 6% is the most likely
growth rate. At this rate, the occupancy rate of hotels
will continue to decline over the next few years to 56.4%
in 1987-88. New major hotels require about 70% to break
even, in contrast to established hotels that could show
profits with 50%-60% occupancy rates. Even with the highly
optimistic 10% growth in tourist arrivals annually, the 12
hotel projects from the 1978-82 URA land sales do not
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promise to be profit-making ventures.
2.6 THE TROUBLE WITH URA PROJECTS
The sentiment among the developers who have secured
projects from the last 5 URA land sales is that the term
"winning tender" is inappropriate. According to market
sources, not one of the developers who had submitted a
winning tender for any of the commercial or residential
land parcels has shown a profit. Most of the developers
have suffered losses and those with on-going projects are
carrying great financial burdens. Nevertheless, it is
evident that they have placed themselves in such a quandary
by willingly over-bidding in the URA land sales.
Towards the end of 1984, a consortium of 4 of Hong Kong's
largest and most experienced developers returned the 2 land
parcels which they had secured in the 9th land sale to URA.
The consortium forfeited S$16 million in payments already
made to the URA for the land parcels which were
collectively worth S$62 million in 1980-81. After this,
URA informed the other developers undertaking the agency's
projects that it would not take back any other land
parcels.
The country's second largest developer, Singapore Land, is
running into financial problems as a result of investments
in 2 major URA projects. Singapore Land has a 68% stake in
Gateway, the prestigious twin towers of office space in the
Central Area, designed by I.M. Pei. The land parcel was
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acquired in the 9th sale for about S$140 million with
construction costs estimated at S$350 million. By mid-
1983, the book value of the project was just S$407 million.
The independent valuation for it was S$244 million at the
end of 1984, even though construction costs were also re-
estimated at S$500 million. The completed project will
supply 750,000 square feet, but it is anybody's guess what
the completion date will be. The first tower was scheduled
for completion in 1986, but work has stopped since the end
of 1984.
The other troubled Singapore Land project is the billion
dollar Marina Square in which the developer has a 32%
share. This project, designed by John Portman, will
feature 3 hotels containing 2100 rooms in all. With over
630,000 square feet of retail space on its premises, Marina
Square is the largest development of its kind in Southeast
Asia. Marina Square should have come on-line at the end of
last year, but its consortium of developers, faced with
problems on both the hotel and retail fronts, has delayed
its completion. The hotel occupancy rate in Singapore is
currently 65% which is a far cry from the average rate of
86% in 1978-81.
The Harapan Group of Indonesia made a spectacular entrance
to property development in Singapore by securing 6 prime
hotel sites in the 7th, 8th and 9th URA land sales. It is
showing losses in all its investments in URA projects. Its
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largest and most extravagant project is the Rahardja Centre
in which work has stopped at the foundations. This
complex, designed by the Chicago firm of Daniel, Mann,
Johnson and Mendenhall, will feature 3 hotels with a total
of 2700 rooms. A convention and exhibition structure
encompassing 360,000 square feet, the largest in Southeast
Asia, is integrated into the complex. The Harapan Group
acquired the project site from the URA with a S$400 million
bid in 1982. Today, the site is probably not worth more
than S$240 million. The current estimate of the project
cost is S$1.1 billion which is about 37% more than the
original estimate in 1983. The cost is likely to escalate
further because of the indefinite delay in construction.
In fact, it is unlikely that this project will be completed
within the next 5-8 years. Thus, one of the focal points
of the Central Area redevelopment, according to the URA,
may persist as an unsightly hole in the ground.
It seems, therefore, that some of URA's most prestigious
projects are not going to be completed on schedule. URA's
tender conditions for land parcels are supposed to ensure
that developers keep to their specified construction so
that supply is quickly brought on-line to balance demand.
The twist is that delays in augmenting the supply are more
likely to achieve the balance now, if at all. Almost
without exception, the URA has given developers extensions
based on 30% of the original construction period, but this
may still be an insufficient allowance.
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The financial squeeze on the developers is also felt by
URA. Developers still owe URA S$2 billion out of the S$3
billion committed to the agency in the sales of 1978-1982.
Many developers have defaulted on their payments. In 1983,
URA did not receive payments of S$81 million for 7 parcels
of land. At the beginning of this year, the Minister of
National Development agreed to developer's requests for a
3-year moratorium on payments for URA land parcels. Only
the interest payments would then apply, in accordance with
the conditions of the tender. Even so, some analysts
suggest that not all the interest payments may be
forthcoming.
2.7 A RECENT "NON-DEVELOPMENT"
Recently, developers in the republic gave a strong
indication of their expectations for a worsening property
market and a weakening economy. A piece of prime land for
commercial development, known as Orchard Square, was put up
for sale in March this year. Only one developer made an
offer to purchase the 7-acre land parcel situated on the
Orchard Road Strip. Before 1985, this land parcel was
coveted by a multitude of developers. This event, or what
the local press called a "non-event", deserves some
consideration as there may be other implications involved.
The owner of the land, a private company called Ngee Ann
Kongsi, obtained in-principle approval from the Development
Control Division for a 10-storey commercial development.
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This valuable site was the object of a legal struggle
between its owner, Ngee Ann Kongsi, and the company that it
was leased to for 99 years. One of the terms under the
Agreement and Deed of Compromise approved by the High Court
last year is the engagement of the URA as the sale agent.
The URA agreed to perform in this capacity for a percentage
of the purchase price. Once again, the sale of the land
parcel would be conducted using the tender system.
However, URA dispensed with the requirement for scale
models; the price bid for Orchard Square was to be
accompanied only by the design plans.
The sole developer submitting a tender is the largest
development company in Singapore, the Far East
Organisation. It is the only prominent developer in the
republic that is not heavily involved in the costly URA
projects. Although it participated in most of the tenders,
it only secured some minor projects. In this most recent
case, URA disqualified Far East Organisation's bid on the
basis that the required 5% deposit was not posted. The
Sunday Monitor reported on 21 April 85 that the developer
had bid about S$725 psf for Orchard Square, just 25% of the
1983 purchase price of an adjacent piece of land.
This recent occurrence in Singapore's property market seems
to suggest that developers have very little faith left in
the profitability of commercial development at this point
in time. They are even ignoring the 3 maxims of property
47
development - location, location, location - since the
Orchard Square site is the focal point of the existing
tourist and commercial belt. Possibly, developers were so
cash-starved that they were no longer able to undertake any
developments beyond what they have in the pipe-line.
Furthermore, banks were probably not willing to extend more
credit to developers for new projects, particularly
developers with deficits from undertaking URA projects.
However, it is also reasonable to infer that developers
were wary of being further involved with the URA. Indeed,
with so many developers in financial despair and more
closely scutinised by financiers, doubts are raised about
the private sectors willingness to participate in future
URA land sales.
Thus, the URA's planning and its use of the tender system
appear to have put private developers in financial straits.
However, other factors also contributed to the developers'
misfortunes. Developers were too pre-occupied with the
profit motive to realise that they were bidding themselves
into trouble. Speculation and irrational expectations on
the part of developers, consumers and the URA pushed prices
up to levels that could not be sustained any further. On
the other hand, URA can be reproached for not upholding its
stated objectives of preventing speculation and balancing
supply and demand in urban renewal programme. The setbacks
in the programme indicate that URA has iadequately promoted
Singapore's urban renewal. There is also reason to believe
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that the URA is less credible in the eyes of developers.
I have provided fragmented evidence to show that URA's
land sale strategy incorporating the tender sytem was the
undelying mechanism of the property's market sudden rise
and fall. The catalytic elements within this mechanism are
the marketeers' irrational expectations and speculation.
However, this is far from conclusive, and there may be
other factors which have yet to be revealed. The chain of
effect can be better detailed with some understanding of
Singapore's economic development strategies. The next
chapter provides a model of Singapore's economic growth.
From this, we can obtain an idea of what the government
intended by selling so much land so quickly.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLAINING URA'S ACTION
This chapter provides two perspectives for understanding
the government's acceleration of the urban redevelopment
programme in Singapore. The first considers the long term
economic planning of the government and examines the
changes in strategies according to the needs and
capabilities of the republic. The second gives an insight
to the importance of regional political and economic
conditions to the republic's economic plans. A 3-phase
development model is presented which exposes the pragmatism
and opportunism of the government. In the past, the
government's enterpreneurial skills have served Singapore
very well. The decision to build the mass rapid transit
system (MRT) is another enterprising venture by the
government. The MRT construction impacts on the urban
redevelopment programme as schemes are designed by the
government to capitalise the externalities that the MRT
creates. The government's optimism for Singapore's
modernisation stems from an inadequate assessment of
regional economic conditions. Singapore's success story is
turning sour because of a turn in economic and political
events in the region.
3.1 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
The preparation of Singapore's Master Plan, the
comprehensive physical plan for the island, commenced in
1951 and was approved by the Colonial government in 1958.
In 1960, after Singapore attained independence, the
incoming government put the Master Plan into operation to
regulate the republic's development and provided
legislation to revise the plan every 5 years. The periodic
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revisions are closely tied to the prevailing economic
strategies employed by the government. By the mid-1960's,
Singapore's dynamic leadership perceived limitations in the
Master Plan, which reflected the Colonial government's
conservative policies, In 1967, the government embarked
on a major planning project with assistance from the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). In 1971, the project
concluded with the Concept Plan as its finished product
(Tan, 1972). The Concept Plan is concerned with the long-
range strategy for Singapore's development and covers
projections over a 20-year period ending in 1992. The UNDP
team made these projections based a 1992 target population
of 3.4 million people in the republic. The acceleration of
the urban redevelopment reduced the projected time frame of
the Concept Plan by 4-5 years (or by 20-25% of the expected
period). In all probability, the Master Plan, revised in
1975, would have been altered once again by the stepping up
of Singapore's urban redevelopment.
Why did the government step up the sales of urban land in
the years of 1978-1982? The answer lies in two
perspectives. One concerns an internal dynamic
incorporated in the long term economic development model of
the country. The other focuses on the impact of external
factors on the republic's economic development.
3.2 LONG TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING
Up until now, the foresight of the Singapore government was
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almost legendary throughout the world; indeed, the economic
planning of the island has been used as a model by some
Third World countries. Since Singapore attained
independence from Great Britain 24 years ago, the
republic's economic fortunes have gone from strength to
strength. The republic's GDP has averaged an increase of
8.2% over the two decades with inflation rising at half
this rate annually. Tnis rate of increase outpaces Japan
and is almost on parity with Saudi Arabia. Today, the per
capita GDP of Singapore is about $6,400 per annum, which is
higher than Spain's and catching up with Italy's. Much of
this can be attributed to the government's economic
development strategies. The key actors involved in shaping
these policies have been the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew, the recently retired Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Goh
Keng Swee, the Prime Minister's Permanent Secretary, Mr.
Ngiam Tong Dow, and the republic's chief economic adviser,
Mr. Albert Winsemius.
A conceptual model of the economic master plan is helpful
in understanding the economic development of Singapore.
The model can be schematically represented by a 3-tier
pyramid denoting the 3 distinct phases of the republic's
development. In a physical sense, the transverse
dimensions of successive tiers of a pyramid are strictly
dictated by the size of the base. This physical condition
translates to a condition for development in this model.
Therefore, the foundations of the development of Singapore
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are in themselves constraints for future directions.
EXHIBIT 1: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SINGAPORE'S
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
phase III
phase II
phase I
CONCEPT: THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT ARE
FOSTERED INTERNALLY
I
II
- Towards Viability (1959-1970)
- Towards Efficiency (1970-1978)
* phase III - Towards Modernisation (after 1978)
Exhibit I presents the conceptual model of the republic's
economic development. The next 3 sections outlines
elements of each of the 3 phases of development.
3.2.1 PHASE I - TOWARDS VIABILITY (1959-1970)
1) Bringing down the high unemployment rate left behind by
the British in 1959.
2) Providing rapidly constructed, affordable high-rise
housing for the low-income group which represented
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* hase
* phase
the key
about 50% of the population then.
3) Instituting population growth controls to retard the
then high fertility rates so that "less can have more".
4) Initiating labour-intensive industrialisation on a
large-scale, and promoting the trade and services
sectors.
5) Implementing the statutory Master Plan for Singapore's
development as spelled out in the Planning Ordinance
(1959) controlling all development.
6) Launching a land reclamation scheme to increase land
acreage within the island's sovereignty.
7) Using the mechanisms of compulsory acquisition to
increase the amount of land banked by the government
for eventual phasing into more efficient land usage.
3.2.2 PHASE II - TOWARDS EFFICIENCY (1970-1978)
8) Using the UNDP's Concept Plan as the guiding framework
for national development planning, and revising the
Master Plan in 1975 in accordance with the Concept Plan.
9) Investing in human capital by upgrading and expanding
the educational system, and initiating vocational
training programmes.
10) Starting the urban renewal programme in an effort to
maximise economic yields of land.
11) Setting the target of- housing 90% of the population in
government-built high-rise apartment buildings (HDB
flats) in densely populated satellite towns.
12) Promoting the tourist trade, expanding the level of
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financial services, and boosting the manufacturing
sector.
3.2.3 PHASE III - TOWARDS MODERNISATION (after 1978)
13) Switching to capital-intensive manufacturing, faced
with a tight labour market resulting from a strong
economy coupled with low population growth.
14) Further upgrading of financial services, trading
facilities and expanding the tourist industry, with
projections for 12% compounded growth yearly in 1980's
for the latter.
15) Increasing investment in infrastructure such as a new
international airport and constructing a mass rapid
transit (MRT) system.
16) Setting the target of the annual GDP growth rate of 8%
in 1981-1990 to reach Japan's 1980 per capita GNP by
the end of the decade.
3.2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The model captures the general transitions that Singapore
has experienced in the 26 years of nation-building by its
leadership. During Singapore's infancy, the government was
concerned with addressing the problems left behind by the
British and creating a viable economic infrastructure. By
the 1970's, it was obvious that the government had achieved
its objectives. Singapore had then entered a new stage in
its life where the government looked to sustaining the
republic's steady growth. The government identified what
it believed to be the factors limiting the prospects for
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continued growth to attain an efficient economic regime.
At this stage, attempts were made to enhance both the
output and cost-effectiveness of the manufacturing sector
as one of the cornerstones of the economy.
By the mid-1970's, the government realised that cost-
effectiveness could be achieved if the manufacturing
industries became capital-intensive. However,
manufacturing output would still be constrained by the
republic's small labour pool, the result of the
government's family-planning policy. The importing of
foreign labour could only alleviate this to a small extent.
Therefore, Singapore could realistically aspire to be a
secondary manufacturing force only, superseded by larger
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and many of the 24
countries of the OECD. On the other hand, the government's
ambitions of propelling Singapore to the forefront of the
world's financial and commodities trading markets and of
establishing the republic as a world-class convention
centre are not so remote. The stage for the republic's
modernisation was thus set.
In light of the government's pragmatic style of operation,
the frenetic release of government land in the urban area
can be readily understood. The main intellectual thrust of
these policies is provided by political leadership that
possesses business acumen. The "businessman" mentality,
therefore, pervades the economic planning; such a mentality
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can be characterised as acknowledging the virtues of using
other investors' money to work out personal ambitions. In
fact, this formula has been rather successful since foreign
capital has indeed financed much of Singapore's growth.
The contribution of foreign enterprises to the republic's
GDP rose from 18% in 1971 to 28% in 1981. In URA's 1978-82
land sales, the government solicited an investment of
S$8.32 billion (1982 dollars), including construction
costs, from the private sector. Foreign developers take up
about 40% of this, with the Harapan Group of Indonesia
being the biggest investor.
Perhaps, the government's pragmatic vision was that the
construction and property sectors are bound to wane as the
main engine of the economy, especially in a country that is
land-scarce and developing so fast. In this case, a sector
of the economy that is bound to decline is used to foster
the growth of those that have greater promise, financial
services and tourism. Capitalising on the boom in
construction, when developers were land-hungry, would seem
a reasonable way of ensuring that an abundance of
commercial space would be available for the financial
services sector. By the same token, more hotel rooms would
be available for the tourist industry that was projected to
grow phenomenally.
Furthermore, a greater supply of commercial space and
hotel rooms, ceteris paribus, would result in lowered
prices for these goods. Singapore's commercial space and
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hotel rooms are among the most expensive of the major
cities in the world. Reduced commercial space rents and
hotel room rates constitute an incentive for more foreign
companies to establish offices locally and for even more
tourists to come. While it is in the interests of private
developers to promote the growth of these two sectors to
reap more profits, an immense oversupply results in their
actually subsidising the financial services and tourist
sector. We could imagine that the government subscribes to
the notion that economic profits tend to zero in the long
run. It then promoted this notion for the case of private
developers who had made huge profits from a tight market
early in the boom. However, Singapore is experiencing such
a fearsome oversupply that many developers are on the verge
of collapse, and foreclosure may well occur in the short
run.
3.3 CONTINGENT ECONOMIC POLICIES
With this perspective, government action is seen as being
very sensitive to regional and global economic and
political circumstances. Government formulates ad hoc
policies which they perceive to fit loosely into the
framework of long term plans. The pragmatic facet of
governmental policy-making is fully manifest. The model
for economic development can be modified to incorporate the
constraints imposed by regional circumstances.
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EXHIBIT 2: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SINGAPORE'S
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
regional phase III
economic .............
and
political . phase II
conditions .........................
phase I
CONCEPT: REGIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE THE
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS
3.3.1 REGIONAL ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES
The stepping up of the land sales happened at the time when
the future sovereignty of Hong Kong was seriously in doubt.
There was a significant flight of capital from Hong Kong
which is the other major financial centre in the Pacific
basin. Indeed, the story of Singapore's and Hong Kong's
economic fortunes is much like an East Asian tale of two
cities. Both are land-scarce countries, predominantly
populated by overseas Chinese, possessing no natural
resources except their harbours and their people, and
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having English as the commercial language. The race by the
two countries to be the prime financial centre in Asia has
been an intense one and Singapore's government saw Hong
Kong's potential fall as Singapore's rise. The government
had hopes that the capital flight from Hong Kong would be
channelled to Singapore. To capture this foreign capital,
it was necessary to create more investment opportunities.
Though the race to be Asia's most important financial
centre seemed a two horse affair, both countries faced
competition to become the region's main commodities
exchange market. Malaysia had been fine-tuning its
economic performance over the last decade and its
government gave strong indications of trying to establish
their capital city, Kuala Lumpur, as a regional stocks and
commodities trading centre. Therefore, in the region there
are three markets vying for the third spoke of the world-
wide round-the-clock trading cycle, London and Chicago
being the established centres in the Western hemisphere.
Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei are in the same time zone but they
are disadvantaged by not speaking English and by over-
regulation. Aside from the trading regulations of each of
the cities involved, the other crucial factor on which
success hinges is the level of infrastructure development
and facilities available.
Towards the end of the 70's, China gave strong signals to
the-rest of the world of opening their doors to global
trade. The volume of trade that would be generated by the
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emergence of China into world capitalism meant new
opportunities for Singapore to leap-frog over Hong Kong.
An important comparative advantage for Singapore is that
the Chinese dialect officially recognised there is
Mandarin, which is also the official dialect of China.
Hong Kong's Chinese, on the other hand, are predominantly
Cantonese-speaking. The sentiment was that Tokyo would not
be able to benefit as much from this as Hong Kong or
Singapore, as it is non-Chinese speaking and ethnically
different. Furthermore, the Japanese had been China's
aggressor in World War II.
While the countries of Southeast Asia were registering
significant growth in their economies, the rest of the
world was caught in a recession. A host of strategic
planners and economic forecasters were indicating that the
region of the 80's would be Southeast Asia. Singapore, the
economic power of the region, saw this as an opportune time
to further consolidate its position by drawing much of the
anticipated flux of investments into the region.
Thus, regional events helped set the scene for the
government to make a bold push forward in Singapore's urban
redevelopment programme. The impetus would be provided by
the URA land sales in quick succession in the wake of a
construction boom in the country. Allowing for a lag-time
of 4-6 years for the proposed developments of individual
parcels, the republic would offer a comprehensive range of
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facilities demanded by multi-national firms and overseas
visitors by 1985. By 1988, Singapore would have one of the
most modern commercial centres in the world and be in the
position to increase its share of regional trade and
financial services.
3.3.2 REGIONAL POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Aside from the regional economic conditions, the political
climate of South-east Asia also affected the government's
policy-making. Vietnam's ambitions of expanding into the
South-east Asian peninsula probably poses the greatest
threat to the region's and, therefore, Singapore's long-
term economic prospects and political stability. This
factor coupled is by Singapore's mistrust of its immediate
neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, who are seen as
potential antagonists. Racial tensions between different
ethnic groups in the region have been defused in the last
20 years but the possibility of such problems can never be
discounted. While Singapore is predominantly Chinese and
in pursuit of better relationships with China, Indonesia
and Malaysia are predominantly Malay and wary of China's
hegemony. Both countries-have policies to increase the
share of their national income and assets of the indigenous
majority at the expense of the overseas Chinese.
The government's objective of maximising revenue from the
sale of lands to finance infrastructure upgrading could
be seen as a measure to conserve the large foreign exchange
reserves of the country for more desperate times. By 1980,
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Singapore's foreign exchange reserves were estimated at $16
billion. The current estimate is $30 billion, twice that
of China's, the world's 9th largest economy. In the event
of war or conflict, the foreign exchange reserves would be
employed in a game where the stakes would be far more
important. In a speech at the National Day Rally in
August, 1984, the Prime Minister hinted at such a rationale
when he said that the constitution might be amended to
prevent Singapore's future leaders from using the reserves
except under dire circumstances.
3.4 LESSONS FROM HONG KONG'S MRT CONSTRUCTION
While the construction of the mass rapid transit (MRT)
system is generally outside the scope of this thesis, it
does affect the urban redevelopment programme. In theory,
Singapore's accelerated urban redevelopment was to be
mainly financed by the private sector and this would in
turn pay for the MRT. Thompson's (1982) analysis of the
construction of Hong Kong's mass rapid transit system made
apparent some planning strategies which would benefit the
public sector. I believe that the government's action in
stepping up URA land sales indicates that it was applying
such strategies.
Hong Kong's government realised at the later stages of
building the mass rapid transit system that the positive
externalities engendered by the MRT could be capitalised by
a systematic and thorough approach. Sites adjacent to MRT
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stations would increase in market value as a result of the
increased flow of pedestrian traffic there. Conventional
creation of the MRT along existing densely populated
corridors would not allow the monetary benefits embodied in
the externalities to be captured by the public sector. In
such areas, compulsory acquisition of land would not only
be expensive and tedious but would also bear political
repercussions.
The hotel and commercial developments that had been taking
place mainly on privately owned land in the Orchard Road
Strip established it as Singapore's tourist and retail belt.
Most of the sites in that area that were feasible for
development were also in the hands of private developers
who had already submitted development proposals for
planning approval. Therefore, a re-ordering of the pattern
of hotel and retail developments would enable the
government to create value in publicly owned areas such as
the reclaimed land that is Marina Centre. By selling the
land, the public sector would be able to capitalise the
value that it had intentionally created.
However, the government's plan to integrate a new
commercial and tourist belt into the Central Area is
questionable. The Orchard Road Area is still maturing as a
tourist and commercial belt in that it possess sufficient
capacity to sustain far more amenities and facilities for
the tourist and retail industry. Furthermore, there is no
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reason to doubt that further upgrading if needed in the
near future is not possible. The Orchard Road area was
only established as Singapore's tourist and commercial belt
12-15 years ago. The potential of this area has never been
doubted by developers, chartered surveyors, and retailers.
Indeed, Prof. Motha of the National University of
Singapore's Building and Estate Management Faculty believes
that this area will be Singapore's counterpart of the Ginza
in Tokyo.
Perhaps the government sought to emulate Hong Kong, which
succeeded in creating a new tourist belt in Kowloon's Tsim
Sha Tsui East across the harbour from the existing one at
Queens Central. However, the relevant difference is that
Hong Kong's tourist arrivals and retail volume far exceed
that of Singapore. In addition, Hong Kong's internal
market is far larger since its population is at least twice
as large as Singapore's. Thus, the government's plan to
create a new tourist and commercial belt implies weak
planning and/or opportunism on the part of the government.
3.5 "OPPORTUNISM" COSTS
The government has applied the principle of "making
somebody else's money work for you" which seemed both an
efficient and effective way of sustaining growth. However,
the opportunism of the government and the quick shifts in
economic planning recently have made Singapore's economic
development vulnerable to changes in regional
65
circumstances. As such, the ambitions of the
government for Singapore's urban redevelopment programme
has been halted by several regional events. Firstly, Japan
and Australia have continued to increase their shares of
the financial services market in the Pacific basin,
primarily at the expense of Singapore. Secondly, Hong Kong
has also rebounded back into this market and is enjoying a
steady recovery with the resolution of the sovereignty
issue.
Thirdly and most significantly, tourism has dropped causing
much embarrassment for the Singapore Tourist Promotion
Board which had projected a 12% compounded increase in
arrivals for the rest of the decade. Two factors
contribute to this counter-trend. One is the strong
Singapore dollar kept high by the government because
Singapore is a net importer that is currently building the
S$5 billion MRT, using foreign labour and imported
materials. While this factor could have been predicted,
the other was totally unexpected - the levying of travel
taxes and excise duty on citizens of Indonesia and Malaysia
returning to their own countries. Travellers from these
two countries comprise the majority of the visitors to
Singapore.
Even if some events which transpired could not have been
anticipated, the government's push for Singapore's rapid
modernisation still seems to have been ill-considered. The
policy directives to the URA to accelerate urban renewal
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appear to have been predicated only on best case scenarios.
The government was overly optimistic in counting on high
rates of growth in the key sectors of tourism and financial
services. The most telling example of unfounded optimism
is STPB's prediction of the very high tourism growth rate
through the decade. STPB's forecast certainly played a
vital role in URA's planning for so many hotel projects.
However, the fact that the government readily accepted the
growth forecast and immediately took measures to accomodate
the growth implies that it did not perform an adequate
economic impact analysis. This notion finds support from
the disclaimer later made by STPB's chairman, Mr. K.C.
Yuen, of the impossibility of making accurate long-term
projections "with so many variables involved".
The oversupply of a wide range of property developments in
the form of URA projects is the result of a government
gamble that did not pay off. The immensity of the
oversupply is evidence of the government's taking such a
risky gamble. The collapse of the local property market
has reverberated through the economy, and this is discussed
in the following chapter. Singapore is experiencing a
depression in contrast to the strengthening economies of
its neighbours in Southeast Asia. The projected real
growth for Singapore this year is 5.9% against an expected
inflation rate of 3.8%, which will be the lowest growth
rate since 1975 - when the local property market was also
at a trough, and most oil-importing countries were in a
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recession as result of 1972's oil crisis. The labour
market is slackening and the urban redevelopment programme
has come to a standstill. The Sale of Sites Programme has
been dormant for 3 years. The win-win situation, or at
very least the win-no lose situation, envisioned by the
government is turning out to be a lose-lose situation.
1 Nomura Research Institute projections for 1985 compared
with GDP figures from Economic Survey of Singapore, 1984
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEED TO CHANGE THE OLD ORDER
The forces that shaped the property cycle are the
government's unfounded optimism for growth, marketeers'
irrational expectations and speculative activity.
Exacerbating factors were URA's land sale strategies and
adverse shifts in the regional economic climate. The lack
of information flow resulted in uninformed decision-making
by the private sector. Because of this, there was no
opportunity in turn to critically review the public
sector's plans and basis for making such plans. The
property market's collapse impairs the economic and
political climate. The trade, financial and construction
sectors all face substantial problems. Members of
Parliament have critiqued the government's rationality in
accelerating urban redevelopment. The government is trying
to shift up the equilibrium price and quantity in the
property market. In so doing, the government is enhancing
market volatility as the market is prevented from operating
under established rules. Intervention, through changing
the regulatory order of the market, also creates more
uncertainty in Singapore's urban redevelopment.
4.1 HOW THE PROPERTY CYCLE WAS SHAPED
The analysis of Singapore's economic development model
and the understanding of the URA's system of land sales
together yield a picture of how the property cycle was
shaped. A chain of causality can be constructed:
1) The government elicits inaccurate predictions for
growth in key sectors. Exogenous factors such as
favourable regional circumstances and increase in
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regional tourism would lead to a rise in external demand
for Singapore's services. The implications of this is
the government's notion that the time frame set for
Singapore's economic and physical development could be
shortened substantially. An inadequate economic impact
analysis is the root cause of this optimism.
2) The government gives policy directives to the URA to
accelerate the urban renewal programme and to plan in
accordance with demand projections. The government
makes the decision to construct the MRT as it believes
the system to be vital for successful expansion of
Central Area. The government conceives the idea: the
renewed city that would need this infrastructural
upgrading would, in its redevelopment, generate funds to
build the MRT. The government's opportunism commits it
to extracting finances from the private sector for this
purpose.
3) Developers from the private sector unquestioningly
embark on the projects. The government does not have to
provide new incentives for them to do so. Developers
are motivated by expectations of significant profits.
However, developers have irrational expectations because
of lack of information exchange among themselves. The
tender system is the URA's device for extracting
premiums on land prices from developers. The tender
restricts information flow, and also adds substantial
costs for the developer to the development process.
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4) Higher costs of development are spread to consumers of
property. With each land sale, new records are set for
prices, which then fuel demand, resulting in
speculation. Consumers' willingness to pay reach
unjustifiable heights. Developers see more profit and
will pay more for land. A self-fulfilling cycle is
formed. The exacerbating factor is the land sale
strategy of the URA.
5) The market correction comes as consumers realise that
property prices are way above the latter's intrinsic
values. Worse yet, the market now sees that demand
projections were off the mark and an immense over-supply
is imminent. Shifts in the regional political and
economic circumstances which are unfavorable to
Singapore occur, and catalyse the fall of the property
market.
Thus, the interplay of the government's optimism and
opportunism and the private sector's unquestioning belief
in government forecasts and long-term economic planning
provided the impetus for Singapore's modernisation.
However, there remained a fundamental flaw - an unfounded
conviction that there would be demand for all the
developments. URA's timing of the land sales and its use
of the tender system provided the boost to the machine to
accelerate itself into inevitable problems.
Developers were infected by the government's optimism
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because of the top-down scheme of the urban redevelopment
programme. The flow of information proceeded only in a
downward direction. Developers were not able to exchange
information freely among themselves as well as participate
in a dialogue with the government. For this reason, both
the developers and the government were denied the
possibility of jointly reviewing the government's economic
forecast.
Therefore, a scheme with free information flow for urban
redevelopment might possibly not have led to the sudden
rise and fall of the property market. No doubt, the urban
renewal programme in Singapore is suffering some setbacks,
but this may not be adequate persuasion to the government
to allow private sector participation in planning.
However, the collapsed property market has affected
Singapore's economy to a large extent. Furthermore, there
are also repercussions on the local political climate. The
following sections account for the severe effects of the
property market collapse on the economic and political
system. This should draw attention to the need for private
sector involvement in planning for Singapore's development.
4.2 THE STUMBLING ECONOMY
Basically, the collapsed property market affects
Singapore's economy in 2 ways. The growing glut of
property, particularly URA's hotel projects, impact
adversely on the trade sector. Depressed property prices
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have negative effects on the other major sectors of
Singapore's economy: the financial and business services,
manufacturing and the construction sector.
4.2.1 THE TRADE SECTOR
Hoteliers are preparing for leaner times as more and more
evidence of the hotel industry's declining profitability
appears. The Business Times (Singapore) reported on 25
April 85 that there was an almost "unmitigated gloom" in
the hotel industry last year. With an average occupancy
rate of 75.5%, all but 2 hotel groups decreased their
earnings per share in 1984. The occupancy rate is expected
to drop further to about 62% in 1985 as several URA
projects and the government-controlled Development Bank of
Singapore's Raffles City bring about 2000 more rooms on-
line though the year. The hotel industry is one of the key
industries in the largest sector of Singapore's economy,
the trade sector. The excess capacity of the hotel
industry, therefore, is detracting from the efficient
running of the economy.
Another component of the trade sector which is affected by
the collapsed property market is the trading of stocks and
shares. The local stock market was lackluster in 1984.
The Asian Wall Street Journal on 7 Jan 85 quoted stock
analysts as saying that the prospects for many publicly
traded companies remain troubled primarily because of
depressed property prices. Over 1984, the Stock Exchange
of Singapore's All-Property Index which comprises property
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stocks shed 19%. The strength of the stock market is taken
by both foreign and local investors to indicate the
strength of the local economy. The weakness of the stock
market, thus, further dampens Singapore's flagging economy
by affecting the confidence of investors. This in turn
undermines property demand all the more in a self-
perpetuating spiral.
4.2.2 THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The substantial fall in property prices gave the banking
system a rude shock since 25% of all bank lending in
Singapore finances property deals. Furthermore, 60% of all
loans made by banks operating in Singapore are secured
against land and buildings, according to Hoare Govett (Far
East). The banks' valuation basis for properties, on which
loans are made, has progressively slid down since 1982.
The Sunday Times reported, on 17 Mar 85, that banks have
about S$7.3 billion in building loans at a time when
developers are hard put to sell off their properties. The
banks have their hands tied, however, as additional
pressure on developers to provide more security (or
collateral) may cause a "domino" effect. Developers,
contractors, sub-contractors and whoever else down the line
would simply cave in. Banks might then be the reluctant
owners of a number of URA projects including the
prestigious developments such as Marina Square, Rahardja
1 The Economist Magazine, 4 Feb 84
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Centre and Gateway.
4.2.3 THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
The construction industry, directly linked to the
property development sector, is contracting as a result of
the private sector slow-down in building. This contrasts
with 1979-83 when the construction sector was one of the
fastest growing sectors of the local economy. In 1983, it
was the second largest contributor to the increase in
Singapore's GDP because of on-going projects initiated at
the height of the boom. However, the value of construction
contracts awarded, particularly in the private sector, has
decreased since 1982-83 (Economic Development Board, 1983).
In the last 10 years, construction activity accounted for
5-7% of Singapore's GDP, but this proportion underestimates
its importance to the economy. As is true for any free
market economy, the multiplier effects of construction
through the economy are very significant. For example,
Singapore's manufacturing sector grew in 1980-83 partly
because of the increased output in industries producing
bricks, tiles and cement because of the construction boom
then. There are no detailed studies in Singapore which
quantify the effect of a construction slow-down on the
economy. However, such a study has been performed for the
USA giving an idea of the importance of construction to a
country's economy. Grebler and Burns (1982) found that
increased construction activity lead or coincided with
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increased growth in USA's GNP over the period 1950-1978.
They also found a correlation between decreased
construction activity and troughs in the USA's GNP cycle.
Construction in the USA accounted for about 11% of the GNP
over the period of their investigation.
4.3 POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS
The parliamentary sessions of 1985 have been chequered by
heated debates in the House of Parliament over government
planning. Members of Parliament raised the issue of the
policy directives that led to the immense volume of the URA
land sales. The Ministry of National Development was at
the receiving end of these questions but was unable to
provide answers to the satisfaction of the backbenchers.
This prompted the Members of Parliament to ask the
Minister if a Master Plan for national development truly
existed. In their opinion, national development revolving
around the urban renewal programme appeared so haphazard as
to suggest that there was no adherence to a long term plan.
The Members of Parliament who level the harshest criticisms
against the development planning of the Ministry of
National Development and the URA are, surprisingly, not
either of the 2 opposition members in Parliament. They
comprise a disagreeing faction of the ruling party, a
phenomenon unknown till now. Furthermore, the government
has never before had to suffer the indignity of responding
to charges that long term planning is not being practised.
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Mr. Toh Chin Chye, the former chairman of the ruling party
and one of the most outspoken backbenchers in parliament,
has been rallying against the "burgeoning government
intervention in the economy". In the Budget debate on 18
Mar 85, Mr. Toh made the following remarks, which express
the sentiment of the disagreeing faction:
The government hopes that the private sector will
be the engine of growth in future years. But the
private sector is running out of gas. This hope
will be a pious hope if the government does not
first set its house in order.
Three companies are being liquidated every 2 days
and private sector deficits faced are caused by
structural, not cyclical, factors.
4.4 EFFORTS TO PROP UP THE MARKET
In recognition of the resounding impact of the collapsed
property market on the economy, the government recently
embarked on several ways to give new life to the market.
These measures are either in the form of providing
incentives to consumers to invest in property or giving
concessions to developers. The giving of incentives to
consumers raises demand, while making concessions to
developers lowers costs of supply. In the latter case,
developers are able to supply property at lower prices
without incurring additional losses. Theoretically, the
market would equilibrate at a higher price and at a greater
quantity consumed.
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4.4.1 RAISING THE DEMAND
In the past, owners of Housing Development Board (HDB)
apartments (government-built housing) could only invest
in commercial and industrial property valued at less than
$350,000 for their own businesses. The statutory limit for
investment was S$250,000 for new applicants of HDB
apartments. On 16 Feb 85, the HDB removed these
restrictions. The First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Goh
Chok Tong, said in Parliament that the removal of such
restrictions would "maximise their creativity" and would
benefit society as a whole. He further implied that the
restrictions had interfered with people's investment
decisions.
On 7 Mar 85 in Parliament, Mr. Goh said that the government
might even allow citizens to make use of their savings
deposited with the Central Provident Fund to invest in what
he calls "sound and secure" properties like flats, shops,
offices and factories. The Central Provident Fund (CPF)
is the largest enforced savings scheme in the world. A
quarter of a worker's pre-tax pay packet in Singapore
goes into the CPF mandatorily. His employer adds to the
worker's deposit by contributing another 25% of the wage to
the CPF under the worker's name. Current legislation
stipulates that a citizen may only withdraw his CPF
deposits at the age of 55 years and above. With government
approval, however, a citizen may use his deposits to buy
his first home even before the age of 55. This rule may
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soon be amended. Mr. Goh informed Parliament that the
government "is looking into ways in which CPF depositors
can withdraw funds to buy, perhaps, a second, a third piece
of residential property or invest them in secure
investments like commercial and industrial property."
Another government measure to increase the propensity of
consumers to invest in property is offering credit at a
lower interest rate. On 25 Mar 85, the government-owned
finance company, Credit POSB, cut its mortgage rate for
private housing and commercial loans. In all probability,
the government intended to spark off a round of rate-
cutting by other banks and finance companies. The
government announced this move as being in line with its
objective of promoting home-ownership and achieving a 100%
home-owning society. A round of rate-cutting did not
result as other finance houses and banks obtain their funds
at greater cost than the Credit POSB. However, the finance
companies and banks were pressured into creating financing
packages with more flexible terms in order to maintain
their market share of property loans. The Sunday Monitor
reported on 28 Mar 85 that a number of major banks did,
indeed, take this course of action.
4.4.2 LOWERING SUPPLY COSTS
The government has granted waivers of penalties to
developers for delays in URA projects. Otherwise,
developers are obliged to pay liquidated damages to the URA
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under the agency's conditions for tender. At 2% of the
land cost per month of delay, these penalty payments are
felt by developers in sound financial health, let alone
those in lean times. The government has also given
extension periods equal to 30% of the scheduled period for
construction. For the major projects which
involve a 5-year construction period, the extensions given
would be up to 18 months..
In addition to waiving penalties and granting of
extensions, the government has decided to freeze payments
for purchased land to the URA. The government announced,
a 3-year moratorium on payments in March this year. Such a
move is significant in giving a life-line to developers
involved with URA projects. The URA estimates that its
revenues will be about S$53,000 this financial year as
opposed to S$408 million in the 1981-82 financial year.
Most developers undertaking the major URA projects had made
their huge financial problems clear to the URA over the
last year. These 3 measures which relate specifically to
developers of URA projects were necessary since a number
of developers might have folded, including some major ones,
or simply abandoned the URA projects. The government's fear
of the urban renewal programme becoming a national
embarrassment is evidenced from the fact that it did not
give comparable concessions to other developers.
The government's main concession to developers in the
private sector as a whole is in making provisions to
80
improve the developers' cash flow. The Ministry for
National Development (MND) introduced a new set of rules in
January 1985 which comprises amendments to the Housing
Developers (Control & Licensing) Act, the Housing
Developer's Rules and the Sale of Properties Rules. The
effect of these amendments is to solicit progress payments
from buyers of property within a shorter time frame.
Progress payments are made at each specified stage (or
milestone) of the project schedule; the completion of the
foundation work is one such milestone. With the new rules,
the buyer now has to forward 20% more of the agreed
purchase price when MND issues the Temporary Occupational
Licence. The MND implemented this new progress payment
schedule after a year of review. However, what the
Ministry has given to developers with one hand, it takes
away with the other. The Ministry had to impose tighter
control on quality and the completion date of projects to
give buyers more protection. Otherwise, buyers would have
raised their voices in protest.
4.5 EXACERBATING MARKET VOLATILITY
The government is changing the regulations for property
development and purchase in an effort to shift demand and
affect the costs of supply. Effectively, the government is
transforming the nature of the property market in
Singapore. Government intervention can be a powerful
device for modulating the ups and downs of the market but
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incursions into the property market. -The government's cure
of market intervention holds no guarantee for success, but
introduces greater uncertainty in property development.
The old order of planning for urban redevelopment must,
therefore, be changed. The following chapter discusses the
merits of a collaborative planning effort as a replacement
of the old regime.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MERITS OF COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
Collaborative planning for urban development promises many
benefits which strictly public sector planning cannot. The
benefits are imparted to government, developers, society
and, thus, the economy. Economic benefits are derived from
reduced transaction costs in the market through a greater
flow of information. The government, in being a partner of
the collaborative planning body, also actualises its
potential in being a facilitator of social learning.
Collaboration in planning ensures that a more efficient
and stable regulatory framework for property development is
possible'. Uncertainty is then better dealt with because
the endogenous factors governing price and costs can at
least be determined. Decentralisation is necessitated but
a possible benefit for the government is a larger power
base. Furthermore, collaboration provides an avenue to
nation-building through grooming new leaders from the
private sector. Singapore's private developers are willing
to participate in such an effort to stabilise its costs of
operations. There are also indications that Singapore's
new leadership may promote this partnership.
5.1 COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
A collaborative planning effort for urban redevelopment is
one that has participation from both private and public
sectors. Such a body would be primarily concerned with the
urban renewal programme since both sectors have substantial
interests in it. There would be joint planning of how much
government land is to be released and at which time
periods. Both sectors can come to an agreement on the type
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and scale of developments that they assess as being
demanded by the market. This is where collaboration in
planning for urban redevelopment differs from the current
practice of "co-operation" in urban redevelopment.
Currently, developers have no idea of the amount of land
that the public sector intends to release over a given
time. Nor do developers know in advance the planned usage
and intensity of development for the released land parcels.
It is only just before each URA land sale that developers
know which sites are up for sale and the respective planned
developments of each site. For developers to have more
rational expectations of the market, they must have a feel
of forthcoming changes in land supply for private
development. Collaborative planning provides a medium for
the exchange of ideas on development between the private
sector and government. The narrow scope of this thesis
does not permit me to delineate a structural framework for
collaborative planning. However, in the following
sections, I shall discuss the significant benefits that
such a planning mechanism holds for Singapore's urban and
national development.
5.2 CONTROLLING COSTS
The previous chapter discussed how the government was
enhancing the volatility of the market contrary to its
intentions of creating stability. To the extent that the
property sector has such a great influence on the local
economy, its fluctuations should certainly be dampened.
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Where public sector planning has led to and further
aggravates the cyclical nature of property development,
collaborative planning may be a moderating force.
There are high costs in the expansion and contraction of
the economy as firms enter and exit. These costs are borne
by society. In Singapore's case, the resulting increase in
the costs of doing business can lead to a loss of its
competitive edge in the export and trading market. In East
Asia, only Japan has a higher cost for operating an
enterprise than Singapore. The republic is so heavily
dependent on trade and commerce that in order to sustain
growth, it has to continually increase its market share.
It is vital, therefore, that the republic should endeavour
to control these cost increases, especially at a time when
its economy needs streamlining. Efforts must first be
directed at the "fundamental" sector. The need for a more
informed private sector participation, centred on an
exchange of ideas with the government, is more critical
than ever.
A collaborative planning effort in the urban redevelopment
of Singapore promises many economic benefits. Certainly,
one benefit is the reduced costs of transactions.
According to Miller (1982), transaction costs have 2
components: (1) search and information costs and (2) time
on the market. Time on the market is certainly a
sifnificant cost factor in Singapore's property market.
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Developers are unable to move the sluggish sale of
properties in the extremely weak market conditions. The
time on the market translates to opportunity costs for
developers. In addition, Miller says that markets with
significant transaction costs are characterised by price
dispersion. As we have seen earlier, price dispersion in
the local property market is brought about by URA's tender
s.ystem. If information continues to be either restricted
or costly to acquire, then the price dispersion will
persist. The economics of information theory suggests that
marketeers who are able to gather more information will
derive more gains or incur less costs.
Hardoy and Satterwhaite (1975) made note of an observation
that "perhaps urban disturbances or riots have not occurred
in Singapore because the present economic prosperity has
enough crumbs even for the urban poor." Of course, the
urban poor is an almost extinct group in Singapore, but
continued mishaps in planning may well play havoc with
Singapore's economy. Social upheaval, which has been
typical of many countries in the region, might then be a
reality in Singapore.
5.3 THE INFORMATIONAL PROCESS
When the government intervenes in the local property market
to affect the nature of the market and property development
in Singapore, it is casting itself in the role of the
nation's experimenter. Schon (1971) describes such a role
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as seeking first to identify the correct solution, then to
train society in its adaptation. Schon believes that if a
government is to solve new public problems, it must create
the systems for doing so. Furthermore, government must
discard the structure and mechanisms that grow up around
the old problems. In Singapore's case, it is evident that
there are difficulties with the traditional planning models
and the information systems incorporated within. Wilensky
(1967) asserted that these are problems which are inherent
in the structure and the process of bureaucratic
organisations such as government. The truth comes
painfully close for Singapore's urban redevelopment. It is
the mechanisms by which urban redevelopment is promoted and
managed that engendered the problems in the first place.
Schon says that government must then design and implement
new institutional processes, through which new problems can
continually be confronted, and old structures continually
discarded. He believes that government should be an
informational process. With a collaborative planning
effort, both Singapore's government and its chosen
implementers of the republic's development, the private
sector, will embody this informational process. The socio-
economic and the socio-political constraints under which
the public sector operates will be evident to the private
sector. Inversely, the private sector's financial
constraints will be appreciated by the public sector. The
government would then be obliged to organise and transfer
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within its system the data and the directives on which
policies and programmes are based. The private sector
would likewise be better monitored. The government can
then institute a more stable and efficient regulatory
framework for property development. Speculative activity
by marketeers could then be suppressed. This would be a
worthy accomplishment, in view of speculative demand's
large role in fuelling price increases in the property
market.
Many of the endogenous factors which govern market
movement could be jointly specified by the government and
private sectors. No doubt, a collaborative planning effort
would still work with unpredictable exogenous factors,
which also affect market movement. Even then collaborative
planning will deal with uncertainty more adequately than
strictly public sector planning. The immediate benefit is
that decision-making by both the private sector and public
sector will be less of what Lindblom calls "the science of
muddling through". This can only bear favourable
consequences for Singapore's economic and physical
development.
Allowing for the fact that cycles will still persist
reflecting changes in global events, the government can
then act in tandem with the private sector to modulate the
cycles. Public sector construction can then be jointly
planned as countercyclical activity. This contrasts, with
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the government's procyclical construction of the
prestigious urban satellite, Raffles City. The government
is now faced with the headache of filling the tenancy for
this development, which will be completed before the end of
1985. Better use can be made of public investment in
construction, and collaborative planning allows the co-
ordination of both sector's activities.
5.4 DECENTRALISING FOR NATION BUILDING
A collaborative planning body for urban redevelopment
requires that the private sector be able to review and
affect government policy-making and implementational
strategies. Essentially, this is a step towards de-
centralisation of government. Singapore's government has
already a mild form of decentralisation by setting up
quasi-government agencies such as the URA. The government
is delegating managerial responsibility of urban renewal to
the URA but its policy directives still shift the course of
URA's actions.
The desired effect of delegation is the creation of a
business-like organisation, exemplified by the URA. The
government's foremost objective in the management of urban
renewal is efficiency. However, the many setbacks of
urban redevelopment, which have in turn adversely affected
the local economy, hardly attest to achieving efficiency.
Minor modifications of the URA's strategies for managing
urban renewal are not likely to improve efficiency to a
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significant extent. This becomes apparent in the light of
organisational behaviour. The URA was created to be a
business-like organisation; as such, the agency will seek
to perpetuate its organisational existence and goals. The
URA cannot help but seek to maximise revenues for the
government, whether or not the government continues to be
opportunistic.
A collaborative planning body would restrain the public
sector from being a predator on the private sector. Such a
planning body for urban redevelopment would be predicated
primarily on devolution, a form of decentralisation.
Devolution entails the creation of a unit of government
with a distinct legal status from central government. The
boundary separating the collaborative body from government
is drawn from the former's ability to plan and not
legislate. However, it is essential that government can
hand out responsibility effectively. For all intents and
purposes then, the collaborative planning body must be a
planning satellite in government. Thus, a re-arrangement
of government structure would be necessary to ensure that
responsibility is adequately assigned. This re-arrangement
is in effect deconcentration, which is another form of
decentralisation. The collaborative planning body in lying
within government makes it accountable to society. Its
distinction from government enables it to act more quickly
to any societal call for changes in planning.
Singapore's government structure can accomodate this
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addition because the nation is young and still imbued with
the dynamism of its leadership. The private sector would
then be made to bear a social burden by being answerable to
society. However, it is compensated by the benefit of its
financial burden being reduced through less risks in the
development process. Rondinelli et al (1983) observes that
devolution enhances productivity and is an avenue for well-
informed participation. The training in administration,
afforded by decentralisation, will establish a new breed of
leaders from the private sector for Singapore. This breed
of leaders would have cultivated a sense of nationalism and
social awareness while possessing enterpreneurial skills.
This is vital because of Singapore's prosperity is
contingent on its leadership's enterprise. The fact that
the government is experiencing a transition of leadership,
as the pioneers retire, drives the point home.
Decentralisation is weakened by failure of the central
government to transfer financial resources (Conyers, 1983).
However, the collaborative planning body does not result in
the private sector bearing less financial responsibility
for urban redevelopment. By all accounts, the status quo
in the financing of development will be preserved even if
risks are reduced for the private sector.
The prerequisite for the realisation of decentralisation is
that central government must enjoy a strong power base.
Singapore's government fulfills this prerequisite. The
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same government has ruled Singapore since the country's
-independence from the British. Furthermore, no drastic
political turnarounds are likely in the near future as the
opposition is disorganised. In the 1984 elections, only 2
were voted in by the electorate. Singapore's Parliament
currently has 79 seats. However, the government was jolted
back to earth because it captured 12% less of the popular
vote than in 1980. The paradox of decentralisation is
that the power base is enlarged. It would seem that
political prudence may dictate a consideration of a private
sector-public sector collaboration in planning. Rondinelli
and Cheema (1983) advise governments not to think about
decentralisation but just to do it. By the same token,
Singapore's government should be prompted to set up a
collaborative planning body as a vehicle of consolidating
its power.
5.5 LEARNING THROUGH COLLABORATION
The promotion and management of the urban redevelopment
programme in Singapore can also be seen to take the form of
the centre-periphery model. The government and its agency,
URA, lie in the centre and the private sector in the
periphery. If evaluation tends to be limited to the role
of establishing the extent of peripheral conformity with
central policy, as Schon (1971) says, barriers exist for
the government to learn from the private sector. This is,
in itself, an undesirable state of affairs. However, there
are further consequences of this barrier to learning. The
95
significance of the private sector's role for developing
property for society's consumption means that the private
sector is attuned to the needs of society. Thus,
Singapore's government in being unable to learn from the
private sector is further impeded from learning from
society. The government cannot then know the requisites of
the people with regard to Singapore's urban redevelopment.
Current problems in the urban redevelopment programme
could also be read as reflecting a gap in the government's
understanding of its people. The persistence of
centralised planning could conceivably result in a form and
function of a city that does not increase the welfare of
its users. Indeed, the government's image of Singapore as
the space-age garden city has met with some cries of
derision. It would be wise to heed Turner's (1968) words
of caution. He said that a government's influence on
development will be proportional to its understanding of
ordinary people's needs and its ability to work, not for
them but, with them.
5.6 WILLING PARTNERS?
Singapore's developers have made many appeals to the
government for assistance in recent months. It is clear,
therefore, that violent movements of the property market
are far from beneficial to them. There is every reason to
believe that they are ready to collaborate in planning -with
the government. The top-down scheme of urban
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redevelopment in Singapore has not served them well thus
far. The stabilisation of the property cycle, through
collaborative planning, may mean less profits for them when
the market is at its strongest. However, stabilisation
also ensures that losses are cut down in weaker markets,
since the depression will be milder. Developers in
Singapore have begun to realise that the short-run losses
can be extremely significant. To hope for huge profits
when the peak comes again is an idea that is now far
removed from their minds. They have already seen that, in
the short-run, some of them are compelled to exit from the
market because of foreclosure by creditors.
There are already calls by the private sector for a fore-
runner to a collaborative planning body. In April this
year, the Institute of Surveyors and Valuers urged the set-
up of a consultative committee to look into the dangers of
"wild fluctuations in property prices". The Institute
suggested that the committee should comprise
representatives from the public sector and developers along
with it. The Institute said that the committee should
formulate a strategy to ensure that future price variations
are gradual rather than precipitous.
Friedman and Hudson (1974) observe that any lasting change
in process and structure must come from within the
organisation. Far-reaching changes in awareness,
attitudes and values on the part of its constituents are
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involved. -This is'the operating principle of organisational
development. The self-transformation is initiated through
learning and, in turn, the new process leads to greater
learning. It is evident that the government has realised
that it has made some errors of judgement in its urban
redevelopment policies. In his Budget Speech of 9 Mar
1985, the Finance Minister, Mr. Tony Tan said:
"It is vital that we utilise our limited supply
of land as efficiently as possible. The most
effective way to ensure the most optimum use of
our land resources is, as far as possible, to
allow market forces to dictate the allocation
and pricing of land. We should try to remove
bureaucratic hurdles which distort the economic
use of land.
As the major owner of land in Singapore,
Government should ensure that there is an
adequate supply of land in order to prevent
prices from escalating. But Government should
never release too much land at any one time so as
to create a property slump. Until the demand for
property catches up with the supply that is in
the pipeline, I see no need for government
departments, or statutory boards, to embark on
new commercial or office developments."
In a subtle way, the Finance Minister was blaming the top-
down scheme of urban renewal programme for depressing the
property market and the resulting economic slow-down.
Clearly, he is pointing out the inadequacies of the
government policy to accelerate urban redevelopment and
URA's management of the programme. The Minister made
a significant statement that "policies which were correct,
when we were in the early stages of development, are no
longer appropriate, now that we are on the verge of
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becoming a newly industrialised society." The Minister is
one of the second echelon of leaders, who will steer
Singapore's development path when all the members of the old
leadership have left the political arena. If he voices the
thoughts of the incoming leadership, Singapore's government
might well be a willing partner in a collaborative planning
mechanism.
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CONCLUSIONS
Abrams (1959) said that "there is no doubt that planning by
the state, whether such a state be monocratic, fascist, or
communist, can sometimes work miracles." He contended
that:
with state planning, there is more accuracy in
the forecast and in the product. The state
decides what is good and what is needed, and
somehow everything and everyone is expected
to fall into line as projected because the
whole economy is planned.....
To a large extent, this describes Singapore's success story
in the first 20 years as a nation. Thereafter, the
government's ambitious plans for Singapore took on a scale
that invited difficulties for ordered and smooth urban
development. Forecasting exogenous factors, which sustain
growth in the externally-oriented economy, is no easy task.
The government were badly off-track. In hindsight, it is
easy to criticise the government's misjudgement. However,
the inescapable fact is that "to err is human". The call
for collaborative planning is not to address the problems
in making predictions. Instead, it is to correct the
system defects that exacerbate the intensity of these
errors. It is to ensure that there are ways to deal with
errors if and when they are made.
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Collaboration in planning is a check against the
government's engaging in the real estate business where the
government monopolises the main factor of production -
land. Afterall, the welfare motive that justifies the
government's forays into the property market, resulting in
financial deficits for the private sector, is dubious. If
anything, the welfare of society has decreased with higher
transaction costs and a host of under-used buildings.
Collaborative planning ensures that the private sector can,
to some extent, "regulate" the government's abuse or misuse
of its monopoly. A bi-directional regulatory feedback
mechanism exists, simultaneous with the information flow
across private and public sector.
Private sector and public sector will then restrain, not
sustain, each other's speculative tendencies. As long as
the government continues to be the real estate dealer par
excellence, it or its agency, URA, will always be tempted
to devise ways to extract premiums on land. The need for
this checking mechanism is, thus, all the more important.
Collaborative planning is the only viable recourse insofar
as there is no possibility of the government relinquishing
its land bank.
The relevant question is then: "How can the collaborative
planning mechanism stand up to the government's ideology
for government to accept it?" Certainly, the Finance
Minister has spoken about the need to restore the
market as the meeting place of the supply and demand of
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land. However, a monopoly operating in free market
conditions nevertheless entails deadweight losses to
society. The government, which has been put in power by
the people as caretakers of their welfare, cannot ignore
this economic fact. Thus, when the free market fails to
allocate equitably to society under monopoly conditions,
collaborative planning which dampens the monopoly power
must be considered by policy-makers.
Students of government might also have serious reservations
about the intended consequences of collaborative planning.
In their minds, collaborative planning could lead to
collusion between private and public sector. However,
Singapore's government has an impeccable record of clean
government. In the past 26 years, it has shown tenacity in
preserving national interests. It is definitely not in
Singapore's interests that land and property prices should
be kept artificially high through collusion. Foreign
investors would be discouraged from venturing into
Singapore. The country would lose its competitive edge as
an exporter of goods and services because land and space,
as factors of production, would be too expensive. Thus,
collusion by the private and public sector may result in
stable and high property prices but the trade-off made here
would be higher costs of production. Collaboration without
collusion, on the other hand, ensures. that the property
market is stable and that prices never rise or fall too
much.
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Though the government's focus on the ills and the cures of
accelerated urban redevelopment is different from mine, I
believe that collaborative planning may yet be a reality.
Naturally, the process of instituting such a mechanism is
likely to be incremental. Still, the statements of the
second echelon leaders indicate that there is a new
mentality in the government - one that is more liberal than
that of the old leadership, and one that would adopt new
forms of planning and decision-making. The setting up of a
high-level 12-man Economic Committee, comprising 9 members
from the private sector, in April this year exemplifies the
point. The Economic Committee is charged with the task of
reviewing the government's 10-year Economic Development
Plan for Singapore for this decade. Sub-committees will
also be formed to conduct detailed sectoral reviews of the
economy. Clearly, this represents a move towards some
collaboration in planning for urban development.
Furthermore, the government's drive for computerisation
throughout Singapore can enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of collaborative planning. Computers are
valuable tools for the compiling of data and information
from both sectors. The collaborative planning body will
then have a data-base of past, present and future
developments for forecasting purposes. Historic and
present vacancy rates and purchase prices of land and
property would be featured in the data-base. This
information can be freely disseminated to developers in and
103
outside of Singapore. The vital free flow of information
is, thus, facilitated. Furthermore, there is now a wide
range of computer packages which enables sophisticated
forecasting and market analyses to be quickly and
inexpensively performed.
Land is finite and, thus, a scarce resource. In the little
island republic of Singapore, land is much more so of a
scarce resource. It is desirable that land is utilised in
such a way as to give the country the greatest money and
social benefits. Collaborative planning in Singapore's
urban development may be a possible mechanism of ensuring
this optimality.
Towards such an end, there are some areas which could be
further researched to gather more support or disprove the
viability of collaborative planning. The URA's tender
system, an exacerbating agent of the cyclical nature of
property development, could be the object of investigation.
It may be interesting to quantitatively account for the
costs built into the development process and examine how
much of this is spread to society by URA tenders. A
comparison of the tender system and the auction system for
land sales may offer a perspective on seeing the costs and
benefits to society of each system. The Hong Kong
government employs the auction system for land sales. A
comparative study of urban development in Hong Kong and
Singapore may highlight significant differences in policy-
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making and planning, with the'land sale systems as the unit
of analysis.
The viability of the collaborative planning body depends
largely on this mechanism being able to operate in the
existing political and legal framework of Singapore. The
regulations of property development are a component of the
legal framework. Legislation relating to land, especially
compulsory acquisition and zoning, is also part of the
framework. Research should be directed towards
establishing which reforms are needed for collaborative
planning to be effective, and what is the likelihood of
these reforms being made. Furthermore, an investigation
should also define constraints under which a collaborative
planning body would operate.
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APPENDIX A
The main map of Singapore shows the location of the Central
Area and the URA sites sold outside this area (source: tURA
Chronicle of Sale Sites-)
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Singapore has one of the highest population
densities in the world. Over 2.5 million
people live on an island of 618 sq. km. in
area or about 4,000 people per sq. km.
The Central Area, which is the central
business district of Singapore, is in the
south, where trade and commerce has been
established from Singapore's earliest days.
Most of the URA projects are in this Central
Area. However, some projects are widely
spread, from West Coast to Ang Mo Kio
roughly in the centre of the island, to Changi
on the northeast coastline.
Central Area
(see page 12 for URA sites)
Sites sold under Sale of Sites
Programme (outside Central Area)
(source: MND)
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APPENDIX B
The maps show the URA sites sold in the Central Area and
the Orchard Road Strip. In the upper map, Marina Centre
is bounded by Marina East and Marina South, it is not
labelled.
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF URA SALE OF SITES PROGRAMME
(source Urban Redevelopment Authority)
reproduced from the Building and Real Estate Statistics
Yearbook 1983
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Floor Space Generated
Year Site Area R HotelSales Launched (sq m) Office Shop Factory Warehouse Residential Hotel Cinema Others(sq m) (sq m) (sq m) (sq m) (Nir) (Numr) (Seats) (sq m)
First 1967 139338 56723 125559 - - 564 1320 3 896 33376
Second 1968 52772 163881 75521 - - 89 - 1 262 1684
Third 1969 76 142 159013 121 359 - - 951 - 4 196 12761
Fourth 1974 67066 18500 14130 - - 464 - - 923
Fifth 1976 46805 3857 29 706 - - 68 - - 40068
Sixth 1977 37513 13883 53313 - - 195 1 142 1 000 3192
Seventh 1978 226773 19062 184686 - - 442 3494 2793 6408
Eighth 1979 118 760 79261 106198 9456 11499 493 2131 1 501 9384
Ninth 1980 177 137 128806 53282 19076 64612 130 2482 2000 23 529
Tenth 1981 536334 - 1 989 56372 147860 3549 - - 7996
Eleventh 1982 88921 70636 57513 21366 66361 - 494 - 256
APPENDIX D
The tables below show the amount of investment generated
by the URA land sales and the revenue forthcoming to URA
for the land parcels. The upper table is reproduced from
URA's Chronicle of Sale Sites.
FIrSt '~~'I ~ I 13 13.93 55,72 125.295 554 33,492(carparks, recreation)
Second 9& 4 13 51 169.05 7523 80- - 1.262 1.684 249.17
Third 190 c62 159293 IE1,35 959- - 4.96- 52.761 310.39
(ga0wes, chnic, recreation}
Sale for 1971 23 2 6. ~ -- 3.30
Tourist
Projects -
Fourth- 14 a 8 6.71 18500 14t3 464- - - 923 108,58
(communat faciltles)
Fifth , 1974 41 3.87 *2|706 6 6 40.068 131,92
(hspital. recreation
Sixtn 7 3.74 3,884 53.Sf? 19- 4 - - 3.192 32279
(ietediion)
Sevent 19* I 1t 22.46 19;049 t 16 442 &5S4 2I793 - - 7.720 1.436.80
- *-* - (oCreaion. comimunal facilities
cordence room, exhibition hall)
Eghth 1979 if 19 11.88: 8.230 111,26 46-5 2,07 1,501 t,563(wwehousing) 5886 1431 55
9.393 (Itndusi) (association, temple. erealoa
communal facilities)
Ninth 190 57 1716 130;04 52,848 13 2.482 2.00 63.456 (wehouwmak -28042 2.531.72
15,01t (Indultnatl (convertan. commuu~
-aci1h1ues
Tenth 1981. As 15, 53,63 - 2,976 3.549 - - 149A89 (wethousing) 8.231 1.365.53
54,188 (Induisnal) (communal fac*tiW.sl
Eleventh 1962 19 17 8.90 71.841 54.085 - 494 66.194 (warshouasig) - 854.61
20.791 (industrial)
Total 143 158.85 719.025 I830.345 6,910 11.027 16,848 29t112 (warethousegp)
99.383 (industnal
142.009 8.941.94
press
- ase,
85)
URA land sales and land revenue
Year of Number Amount Financial Revenue
award of of sale generated' Year received
tender from sole from sales
of sites of sites
($ million) ($ million)
1978 6th 97 78/79 5
1979 7th 287 79/80 40
1980 8th 458 80/81 21
198-1 9th 1,165 81/82 408
1981 10th 437
1982 11th 513 82/83 293
1983 no sale - 83/84 119
1984 no sale - 84/85 191*
TOTAL 2,957 1,077
'Developers were gien ammum 10 yars to pay for land.
* Estimated riese na. : e
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APPENDIX E
The following 5 tables are reproduced from Richard Ellis'
1983 review of the Singapore Property Market. They show
the purchase price for land parcels in the 7th to 10th URA
land sale, as estimated by Richard Ellis,
U.R.A. Seventh Sale (awarded In 1960)
Lan o Of Plot RaIo/ Site Area Tender Price
Parcel No. Oevelopment Type of Development Density (eq. m.) Developer S pam
70 Cupoage Road/Koek Road Cinemalentertanmenvshoos 2.68 30555 Orcnard Plaza 6 300
- Cupoage Plaza Pie Ltc
71 Cupoage Road/Emerald Shopo-ng/flats 3.50 4454 Cold Storage (S) 3 450Hill - Centrepoint Pie. Ltd
72 Orchard Road/Buyong 450 bedrooms hotellshocoing 2.76 10325 Good Prooerty Land 4 530 (land)
Road/Kramat Lane - Development Pie Ltd 2.150 (air-
Meridien Shocing Centre rignts)
73 Hill Street/Coleman Street 279 bedrooms notel/snopoing 6 2143.5 Yaoinco Pie. Ltd 6.100
- Excelsior Hotel
74 & 75 East Coast Road/Joo Chiat Snopoing 2.04 8031 Peooie s Park Dev. 2.735
Road - Peoole's Park Ltd
Katong
76 & 77 Leone Hdi Road/Leone Hill Resioential condominium 618.6 pona 20643 Horizon Dev. & 650
- Horzon Tower Investment Pie Ltd
78 Arcaoia Road - Residential condominium 64.2 poha 39964 Singapore Land 230
Arcadia Garoen Pie Ltd.
79 & 80 Marine Parade Roadi Shopsientertainment/office 1 89 31536.6 ParKwav Prooenies 870
East Coast Parkway - Pie Ltd
Parkway Plaza
81 Taniona Pagar Road 338 oedrooms hotel wwi ancdilary 268 9930 Amara Hotels Pie Ltd 660Enggor Roaa - snoosicinematentenainment
Amara Hote
82 New B'ode Road/,Cana 400 bedrooms notelisnoooing 4 5 4149 4 Neene' Products 1 400
Roao - Furama Hotei Pie Ltc
83 84 85 Mar na Centre 2.082 Dearooms notei wIn 2.07 ?52395 Mar'na Centre 065 land,& 86 ancilarvisnoosentertainment Holo-ngs Pte LtC 065 Ia r-
-q'ltSl
U.R.A. Eighth Sale (awarded in 1980)
Land Location/Name of Plot Rao, Site Area Tender PriceParcel No. Development Type of Development Density aq. m.) Developer S pam
B7 V c:or a StreetArao Street 370 bearooms noteusnoooing 3 8003 Golden Lanamark 3.030
Pie Ltd
88 Mddie Road/Bencooien Snooong/oflice 3 6224' Goiaen Fonune 2 100Street - Fortune Centre Deveoooment Pie Ltd
89 Queen Street/Miadie Roaa SnopongtoffIce 3 14653.5 Koon Wan Prooenes 3 230
- Guar- n Budaina (SI Pte Ltd
90 Rocnc' RoadiQueen Street Snooo:ng/ofice 3 4'09 C Hox tox S.u Pte Ltd 4 950
- 4 LOO Su Buci4g
9' .& 92 M-oade RoadiQueen Street Snooolng/ouice 3 3104 Mdi-.a DevewOOmer: 1 800
- M-a' n Plaza
9' Ra"es Place -- 63-storev otce 2294 OUB Ce-tre Ltc 22 600
0UB Centre
:4 & 95 Beacn Road Snooo;n1ago'ce!-;as 3 2077' 4 on For Lanc 4 300
Pie LtC
96 Uoe'r Circuiar Roa& Snoooingenterainmejtifats 3 5 -729 Ore-er Reaty 4 300
Soutr Brace Roac - Pe Ltc
erwai Gailer,; eeL-
97 Cnr Swee Roao Flat 90W ona 5324 Garoer Lanamark I 20
9E U Z~r-3 v
9t O:.aro Boulevara - Resiaental conararm 495 Dona 921 u:ez Overseas Laa Z600
Be L LtL
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,-.1.0.1,k8th URA LAND SALE purchase prices continued
Land LocatiOnlName of Plot Rateil Site Area Tender Price
Paroei No. Development Type of Development Density (sq. m.1 Developer $ pam
99 'New Brioge Roaciucoer 600 tearooms noteisnoOo:ng 3 5 3611 :eocie s Par 6 600
.ross Street - Deveiocment Lta
Crnnatown Centreooint
100 & 100A Outram RoaaiGanges 509 oearooms note/shopoing 2.5 14415 Bes.ana 1100
Avenue - Hotel N;kko Deveiooment Pte. L'a.
101 Cuccage RoadKoeK Roaat 341 tearooms note/snooo;ng 30 5466 -iar N Maria & - 500
Cavenagn Road - m Chono S ong
Second Holiday inn
102 Tannery LaneiGenting Lane tIattea Factoryiwarenouse 2 5 9993 nao inaustral
-Snoo Buiaing Develocme" Ple. LI
'03 Market Streer/Malacca Office 7 0 783 at Lee Psaty I9. 00
Street - Tat Lee Bane Sag Ole Ltd
104 Pasir Paniang Road AssociationrReigious Building ' 2 '656 anon 7ecK S-ang 230
105. 106 & Gulemard Road AssociatorvReigious Busing 1 5 1552 Association Premises -130
107 Dev (Pte) LC.
108 Uccer Changi Road - 293 tearooms noteisnopoing 2.0 7245 R-cniana Deveicoment 960
Changi Meraien =te. Lta
U.RA. Ninth Sale (awarded In April 1981)
Land Location/Name of Plot Ratio/ Site Area Tender Pnce
Parcel No. Development Type of Development Density (sq. m.) Developer S pam
-09 & '0 Soun Cana Acaa, Cfce 3 5 2738 CCBC Centre 24 Xi)
Chturcn Street Pie -:c
Synagogue Street
11' Cec:! Street/ COice 0 575.9 Kan 3-
Boon Tat Street P'ei L:o
i2 Cec:i StreevStaniev Street Ot'ce 50 ''C8 3 Ong& Co O'e -:c 40 )C
1'3 Cect Street, Ofce 5 0 967 3 Giooe Slk Store 33 64i0
McCaium Street Pie Ltd.
1 4 Cec:i Streert O" ce 50 1266 a'var Reaity 2 000
Pooinson Park Ole Ltd.
'15 'aimer Roao/Snenton Wav Of -ce 3.0 30583 Ong & Co. Ole L*a. 23 C00
116 Beacn Roaa/Nicoii H'gnwav Office 3.0 10981 .1 Sangaoore Lana '2.500
Pte Lta.
117 & 1 8 Marna Centre - 2.830 bearooms notei witn 2 0 8023! 0 Suceriana .1500 (and)
Ranaroia Centre ancilary snocoing and cnema Deveooment Pte. Ltd. 2.400 ;air-
-gnis)
119 Orcnara Bouievarai Fiats 427 oona 5733.6 Fulcrum investment 4 500
Cuscaden Road EAtension Ltd.
120 Newton Rosa/Lncotn Road Residentiat Condominium 370 opna 11685 9 Fuicrum investment 3230
Ltd
121 Marine Parade Roaca Office.snoooing 6.5 1684 8 Peoole s ParK 21 530
East Coast Parkway Develooment Ltd.
Peooie s Park Tower
122 West Coast RoaatClementi Warenouse 1.7 2310 Wan Tien Reaty 2.000
Road (Pte) Ltd.
123 & 124 West Coast Roaa Warenouse 1 7 4620 Tat Lee P-ooerty 2.250
Ctementi Road Develooment
125 Nest Coast Road- Warenouse 1 3 3364 8 Wan Ten Reajtv '600
Clementi Road iPte) L:d.
126 & 127 West Coast Roaa Warenouse 1 2 43892 intraco Ltd. 1480
Clementi Road 1 6 2614
128 Eunos Road 5i Flatted factory 2 5 10000 Gordon Lana 2.250
Eunos AVenue 3 investment Lid.
129 Airport Roaat Airoort Link Warenouse 2.0 16637 Gordon Land 2.150
investment Ltd.
111
U.R.A. Tenth Sale (awarded in July & December 1981)
Land Location/Name of Plot Ratio/ Site Area Tender Price
Parcel No. Development Type of Development Density (sq. m.) Developer S pam
130 Lovang Avenue Condominium tvoe nousing 200 ooha 82111 2 Singaoore Airlines Ltd 160
13' BecoK Soutn Road Condominium tyoe housing 300 cona 34523 The First Lae 500
BecoK Soutn Avenue 3 Insurance Co Pie
Ltd
132 & 132A East Coast Parkway Condominium tvoe nousing 420 ooha 93462 1 Eastern Lagoon 870
Becok South Avenue 1 Pie. Ltd
133 & 134 Manne Parade Road Concominum tyoe nousing 440 cora 103182 0 Overseas Union Bank 620
East Coast Parkway Ltd
Sigiao Road
135 Mountoatten Road: Condominium tvoe housing 370 coma 14161.8 Holly Realty Co (M) 1 320
Arnur Road Pie Ltd
136 ucoer Aver Raian Road. ConCominium ivoe nousing 300 oona 612358 Island Concrete 250
Panoan Exoress Roaa (Pte) Ltd
137 Yo Cnu Kang Road/ Condominium tyoe nousig 300 oona 40100.6 Far Horizon . 290
Ana Mo Kio Avenue 4 Construction
138 Eunos Road 2 Flattea tactory 2.5 '1747 6 Kiaw A-k Hang Co 2 260
Eurnos Avenue 3 iPtei Ltd
139 Eunos Road S Fattec Factorv 2.5 140888 Goaen' Wall Realty 2.390
Eunos Avenue 4 (Pte) Ltd
40 TannerV Lane-Gent n; Lane Warenouse 2 5 3691 0 Koon Wan Reai*v (Si 2.930
Pite. Ltd
Roaa;A'oor r Warenouse 2 0 9048 Great Pac:c 2.640
investmenis Ptei Lt
42 A cc- Road a -Dor L n- arenouse 2 0 13771 0 Ruov nvestmen 520
4 o Poaao 'or- L.n- Warenouse? 3239 6 C1v Devetooments 2
LIa
-- & - oor RoadAoor n- Warerouse 1 C, 23605 ' un!ec Overseas 1 27S
BanK L!:
-46 i a e Roac -oo aWarenouse 23964 S w an2
Deve'osoe- ;Pte
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APPENDIX F
Index
400 -r-
350
300
250
200
150
100
PROPERTY PRICE INDEX OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
(1979 = 100)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1093 1984- 1985
The Ministry of Trade and Industry released the figure
showing the Property Index in the 1983 Economic Survey of
Singapore. In 1984, no such figure was found in the Survey.
The indices for mid 1983 to mid 1985 are extrapolated, This
was done using data for property prices (sources Richard
Ellis and Jones Lang Wooton) for 1978 to 1983 as a basis for
comparison with the Ministry s index. A set of curves were
produced and fitted with the index. Data for 1983 through to
April 85 was adjusted to conform to the scale of the index,
The exercise was a crude one but does reflect real price
movements.
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